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1ABSTRACT
The profound transformation of the European electricity system is putting the design of the electricity markets 
that emerged during the restructuring of the 1990s and early 2000s into question. The need for decarbonisation 
and the wave of innovation in ICT are affecting the optimal functioning of those markets. New options, such as 
the ‘privatisation’ of service reliability, are becoming a reality, while some of the solutions adopted in the past, such 
as the reliance on day-ahead energy-only wholesale markets based on marginal pricing, are no longer sustainable. 
These changes call for a rethinking of the way markets are built within the EU. This is a fundamental step which 
academics, practitioners and policy-makers have to make together if they want to provide the conditions for long-
term investments, integrate a growing amount of renewable energy sources efficiently and securely, and ensure the 
active participation of customers and communities at the local level. 
KEYWORDS 
Electricity market design; electricity system operation; renewable energy integration; decentralisation of the 
electricity industry; digitalisation of the electricity industry
2INTRODUCTION
Kristian Ruby – Secretary General EURELECTRIC
The European power system is facing profound changes as it transitions towards full decarbonisation. Stakeholders 
are confronted with the empowering of the energy customer through demand response and storage solutions and 
the deployment of decentralised, renewable generation, which progressively reduces the sector’s carbon footprint.
The structure of the electricity market will have to adapt to these changes and we must develop new business 
models. In partnership with the Florence School of Regulation (FSR), EURELECTRIC has opened the debate and 
gathered innovative visions for the functioning of a fully decarbonised electricity market. 
A joint call for contributions in 2016 triggered the interest of academics and energy experts from across the 
continent. They presented their suggestions at a dedicated event on 7 June, in Brussels. This e-book, built on the 
proceedings of that conference, is an attempt to provide insights for the public discussion and to inspire future 
debates on the topic.
The high-level papers present different scenarios for 2050. There are some interesting proposals on how to design 
a market which is flexible enough to face the challenge of increasing levels of RES. Also, attention is given to 
investment conditions, the perception of risk and the impact of risk adjustments on capital cost in a market where 
RES marginal costs could be near-zero. Other scenarios address the increasing interest in local electricity markets 
in a world where consumers are also prosumers and daily use electric vehicles and storage facilities, and have the 
flexibility to do so.
The power sector is undergoing a complex and long-term transformation: accelerated technological change, 
shifting consumer preferences, the application of ICT technology to link power generation and demand as well 
as the evolving EU climate and energy policy agenda are some of the key drivers impacting the industry. They 
provide unprecedented challenges but also important opportunities for the sector. In the midst of this energy 
transition, Europe needs to ensure secure, sustainable, affordable and competitive energy for all its citizens and 
businesses.
With this book we hope to stimulate the debate on the right market design for our common low-carbon future.
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4SESSION 1
THE MARKET GOES LOCAL
Moderated by 
Juan José Alba Rios, Endesa & Eurelectric
5THE MARKET GOES 
LOCAL
Juan José Alba Rios
Highlights
Local markets and customer empowerment are 
frequently linked in discussions about the energy 
transition. Distributed generation, batteries and smart 
home appliances give us the opportunity to become 
something more than passive consumers, by deciding 
whether and when we want to produce or consume 
energy. Digital technologies facilitate managing those 
decisions: our mobile phone or our home computer 
can decide when to consume or to store energy, and 
even trade with other “producers”. 
This session included two papers with conceptual 
descriptions of what a local energy market could look 
like. 
Pol Olivella-Rosell and his colleagues presented their 
concept based on the Smart Energy Service Provider, a 
communication platform that would facilitate trading 
and scheduling to all members of the local community, 
and would deal not only with energy and flexibility, but 
with energy services, home automation, maintenance, 
etc.
Paul De Wit introduced a conceptual market model, 
where the system operator is still responsible for 
balancing supply and demand, but where all consumers 
can freely trade with each other.
A third paper, presented by Rens Philipsen and his 
colleagues, dealt with a completely different topic. The 
authors explained how, in current markets, hourly 
schedules based on generators trying to maintain a 
fixed injection of power in each hour, to respect their 
energy delivery commitments, lead to a discontinuity 
at the end of each hour, when generators adjust 
their production upwards and downwards, while 
consumption does not follow such a regular pattern. 
This causes significant frequency deviations at the turn 
of each hour. The authors proposed a new approach to 
dispatching, based on power, not energy, which would 
allow for a more natural scheduling where market 
participants would be able to schedule a trajectory 
of power within the hour, not a rectangular block, 
therefore preventing the discontinuities.
A lively debate followed the presentations. Most of the 
questions and comments from the audience dealt with 
the local markets. To what extent do these concepts offer 
something new? Aren’t these services already offered 
by suppliers, who can exchange flexibility and energy 
with consumers, and help them in home automation? 
Don’t current regulation, market arrangements and 
commercial practices already allow all this? How 
can the proposed solutions be made compatible with 
the natural monopoly of the grid, and deal with the 
likely conflicts of interest? In activities that present 
significant economies of scale, thanks to the power of 
digital devices, what is the advantage of being local and 
small scale?
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OPERATIONAL 
CHARACTERISTICS 
OF LOCAL ENERGY 
AND FLEXIBILITY 
MARKETS IN THE 
DISTRIBUTION GRID
Pol Olivella-Rosell, Jayaprakash Rajasekharan,  
Bernt Arild Bremdal, Stig Ødegaard Ottesen,  
Andreas Sumper and Roberto Villafafila-Robles
Introduction
The current decarbonisation of the European 
electricity system via the proliferation of distributed 
and renewable energy production sources have created 
a global surge of interest in local electricity markets 
for local energy communities (European Commission, 
2016). In 2050 the European electricity system is 
expected to have millions of prosumers, electric 
vehicles and storage units willing to provide energy and 
flexibility. They will be mainly concentrated and active 
in distribution grids. Coherently, our vision is that 
of an integrated wholesale market with geographical 
distributed multiple local markets.
The topic has caught the attention of policy makers, 
regulatory bodies and researchers alike. In this paper, 
we present some of the results on local market design 
and operation that has been developed in Work 
Package 6 of the EMPOWER Horizon 2020 project 
(Olivella-Rosell et al., 2016) and presented in (Olivella-
Rosell et al., 2017).1 
1  This work was supported by the European Union’s 
Horizon 2020 EMPOWER Project under grant agreement No 
646476 and by the Innoenergy PhD School.
The local market overview
We propose a new market player role titled Smart 
Energy Service Provider (SESP), which manages the 
local market for energy, flexibility and other services 
as described by Ilieva et al. (2016). A local market 
(LM) is an ICT electricity trading platform, provided 
by the SESP, to sell and buy electricity and flexibility 
in the local energy community (LEC). LM players are 
the local DSO, prosumers, consumers, storage owners, 
distributed generators and others entities allowed to 
participate in the LM (Figure 1). The SESP supervises 
the local market operations with the aim to maximize 
social welfare for its LEC members, while also acting as 
an aggregator able to participate in wholesale markets 
for supplementing its local market operations.
The SESP essentially represents a peer-to-platform 
approach. Decision on local issues are made centrally 
by the SESP and all interactions are executed through 
the platform, similar to several other network markets 
as described by Parker et al. (2016). This concept 
alleviates the transaction-related burden on each 
trader, supports pool oriented energy exchanges and 
provides the SESP with essential information pertinent 
to future and past assessments.
The local market architecture is characterized by 
the multiple interactions and relationships between 
various players as Figure 2 shows. These relationships 
are specified by means of separate contracts that each 
player has with the SESP for energy, flexibility and 
other services. 
The LM ambition is to encourage local generation 
and active participation of prosumers to exploit the 
flexibility that this creates, for the benefit of all those 
connected to the local grid. The LM objectives are 
listed as follows:
1) Support a business model whereby locally produced 
energy is primarily targeted towards local consumers:
• Offer a competitive market place,
• Facilitate local trade;
 
2) Promote the installation of distributed renewable 
generators:
• Create an attractive and competitive market place 
that forges incentives to buy energy from local 
7and renewable resources,
• To cater for increased investment in distrib-
uted renewable resources; 
3) Support trade of end-user flexibility for the benefit 
of the DSO and its operations:
• Managing grid bottlenecks,
• Providing power curtailments under request;
 
4) Support power system balancing in wholesale 
markets:
• In intraday markets,
• In balancing markets such as TSO tertiary reserve 
market.
The SESP platform must facilitate all processes 
associated with creating an on-line community of 
consumers, prosumers and producers. The overall life-
cycle process for a community member consists of the 
following distinct steps:
• Recruitment: it includes all processes related to 
attracting users, signing in and profile creation;
• Commissioning: it includes all activities related 
to introducing equipment and technical data into 
the platform and checking their veracity;
• Engagement: it includes all the processes related 
to defining contract prices and renewal processes; 
moreover, engagement also involves the members 
so that they become active LEC members;
• Exchanges: it includes all processes related to veri-
fying and monitoring energy and flexibility trades 
and exchanges;
• Settlement: it defines the total amount of energy 
and flexibility activated and requested; it produces 
the delivery note to be sent to LM participants.
According to the peer-to-platform approach, all LM 
participants need to have a contract with the SESP and 
direct negotiations between traders are not allowed. 
For example, consumers have a contract for consuming 
electricity and producers for selling electricity, and 
these contracts can be renewed periodically every 
month, week or day depending upon participation 
levels. The SESP issues all contracts and offers a 
brokering, clearing and price settlement service.
The contracts are between:
• SESP-DSO: it defines the information shared, 
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Figure 1: Local market overview with components and ICT infrastructure
8message exchanges, actions, timetable, responsi-
bilities of each partner and the rewards for each 
service provided by SESP;
• SESP-Consumer: it defines the energy consump-
tion price, flexibility reservation and activation 
prices, and penalties for failures to meet contrac-
tual obligations;
• SESP-Producer: it defines the price for energy and 
flexibility supplied to the grid and compensations 
for energy curtailed.
Local energy and flexibility 
markets 
As shown in Figure 2, the LM can be split in three 
segments, two of which have clear parallels in the 
wholesale markets. The Local Energy Market (LEM) 
has a negotiation period equivalent to the wholesale 
day-ahead market, while the Local Flexibility Market 
(LFM) is equivalent to the intraday and the balancing 
wholesale markets.
SESP acts as a retailer in the LEM; it buys and sells 
local and renewable energy from/to local market 
participants respectively. Additionally, the double 
prosumers’ role requires a special contract with prices 
for generating and consuming electricity. 
In the LFM the SESP controls its members’ flexible 
resources such as thermal loads, electric vehicles, 
batteries, etc. during certain time intervals and 
rewards them accordingly based on their offered prices 
in flexibility contracts. 
The LFM can be used for:
• Complying with DSO’s requests to prevent grid 
overloads caused by consumption or generation 
from community members or others connected to 
the same grid. Thus, the LFM allows the DSO to 
prevent grid damages and postpone grid rein-
forcements;
• Compensating local deviations due to forecasting 
errors or other issues to reduce deviation penalties 
for the SESP in wholesale markets. The SESP uses 
the ICT platform to send flexibility control signals 
to compensate community deviations, if the devia-
tion penalty is higher than the flexibility costs;
• Bidding in balancing markets by aggregating 
community members’ flexible assets. These bids 
support TSO’s operations thanks to the SESP’s ca-
pability for increasing or decreasing consumption 
Figure 2: Local market interaction with wholesale markets
9or generation. SESP sends bids to the TSO based 
on the system status prognosis.
In order to schedule LEC flexible assets, the LFM 
executes an optimization algorithm that minimizes 
the costs involved in allocating the required flexibility. 
It can be formulated as a single-side auction between 
flexibility providers and the SESP as flexibility 
consumer. This function can maximize the LEC welfare 
or it can be a minimization operation cost for SESP. 
Moreover, flexibility rewards can be formulated as 
pay-as-bid or pay-as-clear. However, pay-as-clear 
proposition in small scale auctions could increase the 
cost of using flexibility. For example, in case of meeting 
a DSO request, if the clearing offer is more expensive 
than the other accepted offers, it could imply an over 
cost for the DSO and therefore for the end customers. 
Therefore, this work proposes to use pay-as-bid option 
and a minimization cost function in contrast to 
maximizing the social welfare. Nevertheless, this is an 
open question and the answer could be different case-
by-case.
During the operation, the flexibility provided by an 
end-user is measured as the power forecasted between 
the switch off and on signals. This proposition has the 
disadvantage of including forecasting deviations in the 
flexibility estimation.
In the other services market, SESP takes advantage 
of the technical infrastructure found in a given area 
and uses the information to create new business 
opportunities. SESP can provide its members with 
technical maintenance, insurance, home automation 
functionalities, energy efficiency tips and others. 
Therefore, SESP increases the level of service that 
community members can enjoy. Additionally, new 
opportunities through innovative services can occur 
and cross-subsidies can benefit local energy trade.
The fundamental guiding principle for SESP operations 
is represented by the equation:
  
where  and  are the local energy 
production (positively valued) and consumption 
(negatively valued) during period   
and are considered the baseline and not 
included in the flexible consumption and production.
 is the energy sold 
( ) or bought 
( ) in the day-ahead and 
intraday wholesale markets.  is the 
total requested flexibility by external agents like DSOs 
and TSOs, and  is the flexible energy for 
up-regulation ( <0) and down-regulation 
( >0). According to Wangensteen (2012) and 
the Danish TSO Energinet.dk (2007), up-regulation 
refers to more generation or less consumption and 
vice-versa for down-regulation.
 can be decomposed into the following 
flexibility components:
where  is the flexibility available 
from storage units for charged energy (
) and discharged energy (
),  is the flexibility available 
from loads for up-regulation (
) and down-regulation (
) and  is the flexibility available from 
generators for up-regulation (
) and down-regulation ( ).
Finally,  is the total energy deviation. 
The decision variable that can be controlled in the LM 
are , , 
 and .
The LEM and LFM constitute a strong investment 
signal because they allow to integrate more renewable 
production without threatening distribution grids and 
offer a platform to obtain additional benefits with their 
flexibility. Finally, it is expected that in 2050 national 
regulatory agencies guarantee that such platforms are 
standard and members can switch from one SESP to 
another. That is necessary to ensure the long term 
investments in generation and, consequently, the 
continuous and secure operation of the system.
Conclusions
The design and operational aspects developed in this 
work for local energy and flexibility markets provide 
the functional specifications for the local market and 
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SESP ICT trading platform. The proposed trading 
platform and local markets are designed to be scalable, 
adaptable and customizable in order to suit the diverse 
conditions and regulations.
The proposed local market design and operation 
concepts constitute hypotheses that will be tested at 
pilot sites in Norway, Germany and Malta during 2017.
Assumptions considered for this work include that the 
three local markets described are integrated to cover 
all functionalities around the local trading and they 
cannot work individually. Additionally, it is assumed 
that market participants have automatic trading agents 
to adapt their local market offers to the participant’s 
energy needs. Regarding the LFM, it is assumed that 
DSOs and TSOs can buy flexibility from SESP for 
managing technical constraints. Finally, it is also 
assumed that SESP has the capability to measure the 
distributed flexibility activated via accurate foresights 
and real time data.
The LMs proposed in this work have important 
implications for energy policy and regulation. 
Currently, LMs are facing important obstacles. For 
example, electricity tariff structures in the LEC have 
to be reconsidered to allow energy exchanges between 
prosumers and their storage assets to avoid double 
taxation. Moreover, information from smart meters 
has to be accessible for third parties like SESP and 
aggregators. Additionally, this information should be 
refreshed every hour or quarter of hour to favour local 
flexibility markets deployment and real time operations 
in distribution grids. Otherwise, third parties should 
deploy their own measurement and communication 
infrastructure and that could kill the business.
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THE FUTURE PROOF 
MARKET MODEL
Paul de Wit
Introduction
To create a future proof market model the model 
must be as simple as possible. The future proof market 
model I will present here is extremely simple and is 
built around the customer. It is purely market based. It 
is based on the assumption that the future is uncertain 
and that the model must be flexible to support different 
markets and changing business models of market 
parties. This model can support today’s market model 
and future market models. Instead of making more 
rules this model tries to simplify the market model as 
much as possible.
Assumptions and approach: 
the basics
This model is designed for a public grid infrastructure. 
A system operator (SO) is in charge of keeping the grid 
stable, e.g. by preserving a frequency of 50 Hertz within 
a certain bandwidth. It is possible that the SO operates 
a European wide network, a nation wide network or a 
local community network.
In this future market model everyone connected to 
the grid is a market party. The consumed or produced 
electricity is measured per period with an electricity 
meter (smart meter). This period is used for settlement 
(e.g. per five, 10 or 15 minutes). At a certain frequency 
(e.g. daily) the measurements per settlement period 
are settled. 
Everyone connected to the grid is responsible for his 
own physical balance of production and consumption. 
The meter is read by the system operator with a certain 
frequency, for instance daily. If the prosumer has taken 
electricity from the grid, he must specify, per settlement 
period, all market parties from whom he has bought 
and how much. Every buy and sell is one transaction 
between two parties and contains a certain amount 
of electricity. The transaction is specified by the buyer 
and is confirmed by the selling party. Only transactions 
which are confirmed are valid transactions. 
Some parties are only administrative parties. They sell 
and buy electricity (like today’s traders). A prosumer 
can contract such an administrative party to take over 
his risk of consuming more than the amount of energy 
he has bought or take over the risk of the prosumer of 
producing more than he has sold. Like today’s balance 
responsible parties.
Parties who have consumed too much have bought this 
amount of energy from the SO and parties who have 
produced too much have sold this surplus to the SO. 
The SO keeps the physical balance of the total system. 
Buying and selling from the SO is discouraged (i.e. it is 
more expensive than resorting to the market on time). 
The grid losses are the difference between the measured 
total volume of the production and measured total 
volume of the consumption. The SO is responsible for 
these grid losses.
Methodology: the market
There is at least one public market place operated by 
the (public) SO, but everyone is free to do his trades 
wherever he wants. The only regulation required is 
that everyone must specify his transactions (buys 
and sells) before a certain deadline, otherwise it is 
assumed that he has bought his consumption, or sold 
his production (surplus), to the system operator. This 
means that parties are still able to trade after real time. 
The SO can only be a buyer on the public market place. 
He buys upwards or downwards regulation (kW) for 
a certain period of time. This translates into upwards 
or downwards energy (kWh). It is possible that the SO 
buys such energy in a specified region to solve a local 
congestion or anywhere to balance the system. 
Interconnections between two grids can be operated by 
a private company or a public company (joint venture 
between the SOs). If the interconnection is operated 
by a private company the interconnection is seen as 
a normal connection at both sides. Interconnections 
between SOs create the only exemption in the system. 
Transactions which buy electricity from neighbouring 
grids require a booking in advance. If the total booked 
capacity exceeds the physical capacity, the booking 
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is rejected. Also the booked transaction needs to be 
confirmed before a certain deadline by the counter 
party.
The present and the future
We can create such a system already in today’s 
market. The customer is then in full control. In 
theory, every customer can buy or sell per settlement 
period (e.g. 15 min) any amount of electricity to any 
party who is registered in the system. Of course, it is 
most likely that today only large customers use the 
full potential of this model and that customers with 
smaller connections only use a small subset of the 
possibilities. Market parties like today’s suppliers are 
likely to provide a standardised profiles to customers 
and today’s balance responsible parties will take over 
the risk of the differences between the measured values 
and estimated consumption/bought production. But 
other business models are also possible. Obviously, 
evolutionary steps can be defined to provide fall back 
options to customers. In that case the customer starts 
with a supplier/balance responsible party who takes 
over the risks from him (like it happens mostly today). 
How to reach a decarbonised 
electricity market in 2050?
There is an EU tax on CO2 emissions (like todays EU 
Emissions Trading System). This way energy produced 
with CO2 emissions is more expensive than energy 
produced without CO2 emissions. The tax is set 
relatively high and by this way the market is stimulated 
to find solutions to produce electricity with as less CO2 
emissions as possible in the most cost effective way. 
It stimulates investments in new CO2 free generation 
assets. 
How to address system 
adequacy
Because of the active participation of all prosumers, 
this model stimulates decentralised, CO2 neutral, 
generation as much as possible. The most cost 
efficient balance will be reached between centralised 
production, decentralised production, energy savings 
and demand side response. The prosumer can choose 
to produce and consume his own electricity or to 
reduce his consumption during expensive peak times. 
This has a direct financial impact on the prosumer. Of 
course, it is most likely that a prosumer will not do this 
manually but by using an energy management system 
present in his home.
Large scale centralised (CO2 free) production of 
electricity is still possible. It is very likely that large 
scale off-shore wind parks are also profitable in this 
model. The model is technology neutral. It does not 
favour a specific type of technology over another one. 
But because of the taxation of the CO2 emissions, it 
stimulates CO2 free production of electricity. 
What is the difference with 
today’s market design?
The essential difference between today’s system and 
this future system is that the customer is allowed to 
specify his allocation/transactions. The allocation is 
not determined by the SO but by the customer. 
In this model there is no day-ahead, intraday or 
balancing market. There is only one public market, 
where parties are allowed to trade wherever they want. 
As long as a transaction is confirmed by both parties. 
Parties are also not obliged to forecast their production 
and consumption (maybe only very large ones). There 
is only one market role in this market model and 
that is a market party. Everyone can sell any service 
to anyone else. The only obligation that a connected 
party has is to register himself on the connection and 
to specify his transactions (allocation) regularly to the 
SO. Obviously, he can hire a market party to fulfil his 
obligation to provide the SO with an allocation (like a 
normal energy supplier does today). 
If parties do not confirm their trade, they cannot be 
trusted. This is the same as an on-line shop that does 
not deliver the goods. No one would like to trade with 
parties who cannot be trusted. However, no extra 
legislation is required for this. The market will solve 
this like today with on-line shops.
Trading companies also need to be registered. 
Otherwise, their (administrative) balance cannot be 
determined.
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The advantages of this model
The proposed model is extremely simple and 
therefore very easy to automate and implement. New 
technologies like the block-chain technology are very 
suitable for this model. However, it is crucial that first 
the market model is simplified as much as possible 
before the full potential of new IT technologies can be 
harvested. 
Today’s IT capabilities make it possible to see 
all injections and withdrawals from the grid as 
administrative transactions. This was not possible in 
the past. 
A simple market model still leaves the option open for 
governments to execute their policies. For example, it 
is still possible to implement a tax on CO2 emissions.
This model unlocks the maximum demand side 
response capabilities and creates a level playing field 
for everyone. This model lays the foundation for all 
kind of future developments. It is up to the market 
parties to come up with innovative solutions.
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A NEW MARKET 
DESIGN FOR DAY-
AHEAD MARKETS 
WITH POWER-BASED 
SCHEDULING
Rens Philipsen, Germán Morales-España, Mathijs 
de Weerdt and Laurens de Vries
Introduction
With the introduction of renewable energy sources 
(RES) to the electricity system, the European electricity 
market must undertake a number of changes if its 
current security of supply is to be maintained. In 
electricity systems, supply and demand must be in 
balance at all times. In order to accommodate for 
the increased installation of RES capacity, we must 
compensate for fluctuations in both supply and 
demand. To ensure this balance, we employ markets 
to coordinate who consumes or supplies how much 
energy during a programme time unit (PTU). Any 
remaining imbalance during a PTU is covered by 
reserves, which are contracted by the system operator. 
Existing electricity markets, however, inefficiently 
use the available reserves, because the penalizing 
mechanism for imbalances is based on the total energy 
supplied or consumed during a PTU. Even with such 
a mechanism in place there is no guarantee that 
momentary imbalances do not arise. While the total 
amounts of energy supplied and consumed during the 
entire PTU are equal, it would be incorrect to assume 
this balance also holds at each moment.
What is perhaps even more staggering is that this 
system in fact is responsible for momentary imbalances: 
while aggregated electricity demand is mostly a 
smooth curve, power plant operators sharply change 
their output at the start of a PTU in order to supply the 
contracted energy. This behaviour causes deterministic 
and predictable shocks in system frequency which 
can be observed all over Europe [1]. Despite recent 
advancements, our existing electricity markets are 
therefore far from optimal: even if no uncertainty 
exists, they are unable to prevent imbalances.
It is important to note the effect this has on RES 
integration and the reduction of thermal power plants: 
as more intermittent resources are connected, the 
share of thermal power plants can only decrease if 
they are not needed for the provision of reserves. The 
share of RES in the generation mix is therefore capped 
by the necessity of maintaining reserves, and that 
cap is artificially lowered by our overly high reserve 
requirements caused by imperfections in the market 
design. As reserves are usually procured for a longer 
period of time, thermal generators are effectively 
subsidised, making RES relatively less competitive. 
Consequently, these deterministic imbalances, 
stemming from the market design, hold back the 
widespread adoption of RES in Europe.
Our proposed solution is to make day-ahead schedules 
based on momentary power output, rather than total 
energy output. This would be a radical change in the 
way the electricity system is operated from day to 
day, freeing up flexible resources to deal with actual 
uncertainty, rather than with deterministic scheduling 
inaccuracies. Such power-based scheduling was 
proposed and analysed in [2] and [3]. In power-based 
scheduling, day-ahead schedules assigned to both 
generators and loads are defined as piecewise linear 
trajectories. These power trajectories ensure that day-
ahead schedules are actually in continuous balance, and 
can better account for the actual physical constraints 
on the system. Traditional energy-based scheduling, 
by contrast, does not correctly incorporate generator 
flexibility. This flexibility can be both over- and under-
estimated in making schedules, resulting in infeasible 
solutions in the first case, and inefficient solutions in 
the second. As a consequence of that, power-based 
scheduling is a necessary step towards a more efficient 
operation of the electricity system.
The challenge we currently face is to implement this 
technological solution in practice. Although the 
technical advantages are well-understood [2], [4]–
[7], it is as of yet unclear which changes in the market 
regime must be effected in order to make power-based 
15
scheduling the standard. Products must be redefined, 
and, as a result, changes may be necessary on the way 
markets are cleared and products priced. We therefore 
start by describing the minimal requirements to which 
a newly designed market should conform. From there, 
we propose a combination of market rules which 
ensure a continuous network balance, enabling more 
efficient use of the available generation capacity.
The central question we aim to answer is the following: 
which set of market rules can efficiently ensure that 
there exists a moment-to-moment balance of supply and 
demand in day-ahead planning?1
Market design
To delineate our analysis, we focus on a specific 
market, close to the existing market design: day-ahead 
is cleared 24-36 hours ahead, in a single discrete two-
sided auction. For this discrete auction, we must define 
the following aspects: bid definition, clearing rules, 
and pricing rules. We specify these in the following 
sections. Broadly speaking, we define multi-period bids 
as our starting point, where parties communicate their 
physical constraints (such as ramping or output limits), 
soft constraints (such as deadlines) and variable costs. 
The market is cleared for a fixed horizon (e.g., the next 
day) and communicates the precise power trajectories 
all parties will have to follow. We then discuss the 
minimal requirements a pricing mechanism should 
conform to, and define prices as a price per megawatt 
(and not megawatt-per-hour) of output at the end of 
each PTU. 
Bid definition and clearing rule
The first step is to define what constitutes a bid. 
In defining a bid, we opt for a broader bid than the 
existing hourly orders in order to better capture the 
true flexibility offered by both sides of the market. 
Our preferred option is for both power plants and 
consumers to place bids which closely resemble their 
physical characteristics. Bids consist of lower and upper 
production limits, maximum up and down ramp rates, 
and a price for energy. Furthermore, these bids can 
1 Although we focus here on day-ahead markets, the 
proposed market design can (and should) be applied to any other 
market, e.g., intraday or real-time markets.
be extended by including minimal and maximal total 
energy demand.
We emphasize two things: first of all, this bid definition 
is a generalization of the bids possible in the existing 
markets, and can therefore recreate them without 
any loss of accuracy. On the other hand, they can be 
extended in the same manner to include more complex 
constraints, such as minimal income conditions, block 
orders, or linked orders. Such bids can then be used 
to incorporate physical or economical restrictions, but 
their use is likely to be lower than in current markets 
due to the fact that our basic bid already allows for 
restrictions on the range within which a plant can be 
operated.
Pricing rule
Primarily, our aim is to guarantee cost recovery for 
both generators and loads: no generator will produce 
electricity below its cost, and no consumer will pay 
more than its willingness to pay. In terms of mechanism 
design, this means we insist on ex-post individual 
rationality.2 As a second objective, we aim for socially 
efficient outcomes.3 This is a very natural objective for a 
regulating authority and is already the objective of the 
existing Euphemia [9] algorithm. Thirdly, the market 
operator should stick to that function only, and should 
not have to contribute any money to transactions. We 
therefore ask for a strictly balanced budget as a third 
requirement.4
Economic theory, unfortunately, contains a number 
of impossibility theorems which show it is impossible 
to design a market which is provably impervious to 
manipulation, given the objectives described above. 
Note that this does not imply it will be easy to influence 
a market, nor does it say anything about how inefficient 
the market will be if bidders behave strategically. 
Although robustness against manipulation is 
important, we leave the issue of how vulnerable a 
2  Participants to the mechanism receive non-negative 
utility from participating in all possible states of the market (ex-
post).
3  Given the bids of all generators and load-serving entities, 
social welfare is maximized.
4  A mechanism is budget-balanced if the sum of payments 
by the market operator is precisely zero.
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market design is to manipulation for future work, and 
for now note only that we cannot give a theoretical 
guarantee.
Marginal cost pricing is already well-established in 
the power systems community. It follows from the 
dual variables which are associated with constraints 
in mathematical optimisation problems. These dual 
variables, in an economic setting also referred to as 
shadow prices, indicate the sensitivity of the objective 
function to a relaxation of that constraint. These 
shadow prices form a competitive equilibrium and 
ensure envy-free prices for all participants, who all 
recover their costs [8]. This in turn implies individual 
rationality. They are therefore suitable candidates for 
our pricing rule. 
In defining shadow prices, we must overcome one 
hurdle. In our redesigned market, PTUs are irrevocably 
linked to each other due to the linear power trajectories, 
where increasing the output of a generator at the end 
of one PTU increases the amount of energy in both the 
preceding and in the subsequent PTU. Although these 
trajectories correspond to a unique energy profile, we 
do not price the energy profiles themselves: instead, 
we define point-to-point schedules, and we therefore 
base prices on the power output at these points, which 
lie at the end of a PTU. Using the shadow price of the 
power balance constraint at the end of an hour as the 
price for power delivery at that moment, bidders are 
rewarded for being able to provide both energy as 
well as ramping flexibility – analogous to the value for 
providing energy in the right location when locational 
marginal pricing is applied. The total payment to a 
generator then equals its output at the end of an hour 
times that price. 
Difference with existing 
markets
Now that the necessary rules for a market implementing 
power-based scheduling have been outlined, we 
compare the resulting market with the existing day-
ahead market. One of the advantages of a power-based 
approach is that flexible demand can be rewarded for 
its flexibility in the day-ahead market already. Since 
the payments to the market participants now consist 
of both an energy part and a ramping part, it is easier 
to properly schedule the flexibility offered by flexible 
parties. This is especially important for flexible load, 
as they may have a maximum consumption constraint.
Our work in [7] compares alternative formulations of 
the day-ahead optimal scheduling problems, based on 
unit commitment (UC) formulations. Case studies are 
carried out on the IEEE 118-bus test system. When 
comparing ideal stochastic energy-based with power-
based UCs, the power-based UC presented 33% less 
curtailment and 5% lower actual operational costs.
Conclusions
Existing electricity markets are inefficient. Ensuring 
energy balance during a PTU, unfortunately, does 
not guarantee the momentary balance of supply and 
demand which is a necessary condition for the safe and 
reliable operation of electrical power systems. Power-
based scheduling can alleviate the imbalances which 
follow from the existing market design, preventing 
frequency shocks which threaten security of supply 
and freeing up expensive reserves. This reduces costs 
for consumers and reduces the need for online thermal 
power plants, improving the competitive position of 
renewable electricity sources. Day-ahead schedules 
based on power trajectories are, in all ways, superior to 
energy-based schedules.
Coordinating power-based trajectories in a market was 
until now an unresolved problem. Our market proposal 
fills this gap by providing bid definitions and rules for 
bidding, market clearing, and pricing, delivering a 
comprehensive overview of the changes necessary to 
arrive to a power-based future. The proposed market 
model is very much in line with the operation of 
existing markets, making only the minimal changes 
necessary to fully capture the advantages of power-
based scheduling. In doing so, it improves economic 
efficiency and makes way for further integration of 
RES.
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SOLVING THE 
INVESTMENT 
EQUATION
Leonardo Meeus
Highlights
Oliver Koch from DG ENER was one of the keynote 
speakers before our panel discussion. He presented the 
EU Clean Energy Package and noted that: “maybe the 
missing money problem only exists if you look at the 
future with a mind-set of the past”.
Utilities are indeed missing money, but not only because 
the market is designed imperfectly; at least part of the 
problem is that utilities underestimated the speed of 
the energy transition and the policies that support it 
(financial crisis also did not help). Incumbents in fast-
moving industries do have a tendency to underestimate 
changes.
Many, however, continue to advocate, also at this 
conference, that power plants should receive a 
remuneration for capacity in addition to the money 
they get for offering the energy they produce into 
the market. These so-called capacity remuneration 
mechanisms are already implemented in some 
countries, but remain controversial (see also the 2016 
Sector Inquiry by DG Competition on the issue). 
I had the pleasure to moderate the session on investments 
with Anthony Papavasiliou, Ruth Dominguez, Klaus 
Skytte, and Christian Grenz. Christian presented his 
proposal to organize the markets based on long term 
contracts that would be auctioned in a different way 
than the way we do in capacity markets today. Anthony, 
Ruth and Klaus proposed to fix the market design by 
adding a premium or uplift to peak prices. Instead of 
giving up on energy scarcity pricing, we could indeed 
first try to reinforce peak prices. This would then 
also incentivize demand response and other flexible 
resources.
We also discussed how these fixes are only needed to 
the extent that reliability is still a public good in 2050. 
For the time being, we do not know yet the willingness 
to pay of each electricity customer, and most customers 
can also not be excluded when prices peak above their 
willingness to pay. And even if we could, the question 
is whether we should: are we “protecting” customers, 
or are we making them pay for a level of reliability they 
would not choose, if they had the choice? We will know 
in 2050. See you then.
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FLEXIBLE 
ELECTRICITY 
MARKETS FOR A 
DECARBONISED 
ENERGY SYSTEM 
Klaus Skytte, Claire Bergaentzlé, Jonas 
Khubute Sekamane and Jonas Katz
Introduction
Reaching the European decarbonisation objectives will 
require a higher contribution of electricity generation 
from variable renewable energies, as well as the 
electrification of other sectors such as heat, transport, 
and gas. Future decarbonised systems will therefore 
impose new challenges in terms of flexibility, but they 
also will provide access to new, more-flexible solutions, 
provided the right market design is put in place to 
facilitate them.
Existing markets designs, with a few minor adjustments, 
could, in most cases, provide the needed flexibility 
to ensure optimal short-term dispatch, reliability 
and long-term capacity adequacy. However, in high-
residual load periods, there is a need for better scarcity 
pricing to solve the missing money problem.
In this paper, we combine a premium that strengthens 
scarcity prices and a mechanism that significantly 
mitigates the risk on the investment side, while 
effectively sharing it with consumers. Our vision 
for a future electricity market uses a combination of 
plausible approaches to support flexibility. It aims to 
address the framework conditions necessary to activate 
flexible resources based on: i) renewable energy-based 
wholesale market designs; ii) cross-sectoral coupling; 
and iii) innovative scarcity pricing and risk reductions 
through reliability options. 
Our proposed vision improves the design of electricity 
markets and establishes new sets of frameworks that 
support flexibility as the core element in a decarbonised 
energy system with a large share of variable renewable 
energies.
The future power market
European energy markets are going through a green 
transition toward a future with a decarbonised 
energy system. Centralised, fossil-intensive electricity 
generation is being replaced by decentralised renewable 
energy. A large share of variable renewable energy (VRE) 
sources, especially wind and solar, will be deployed, 
in addition to other traditional storable renewable 
energy sources, such as biomass and hydropower. By 
nature, the temporal supply of VRE is highly variable 
because it depends on weather conditions, uncertainty 
due to forecasting errors and location specificities, as 
the primary energy source cannot be transported, like 
coal or biomass (Borenstein, 2012; Hirth et al., 2015). 
Such properties point to major VRE integration and 
flexibility challenges for the future energy system. 
Simultaneously, the traditional and flexible fast-
responding, fossil-based peak-generators are being 
phased out, increasing flexibility challenges. 
Future European energy systems should be consistent 
with the threefold targets set to improve competition, 
reliability, and sustainability (see Figure 1). Existing 
power markets were created before or simultaneously 
with setting up the EU goal of developing an Internal 
Energy Market, which facilitate low consumer prices 
through competition and reliability by matching 
electricity demand and supply (EU Directive 2009/72/
EC). The market design that emerged over the years 
might have to be adapted according to the green 
transition such that it enables necessary short- and 
long-term flexibility in the system.
The future market design should be based not on 
the perspectives of the traditional electricity sector, 
but rather on an integrated decarbonised energy 
system in which electricity becomes a cornerstone 
in the sustainable energy transition for other energy 
sectors – such as heat and gas – as well as for transport 
and other service sectors with a large share of 
electrification (Skytte, Pizarro and Karlsson, 2017b). 
The progressive coupling between the electricity sector 
and the other sectors will increase the volumes traded 
on the electricity market, as well as competition that 
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ultimately will benefit consumers. If sector coupling is 
done in a ‘smart’ way, it also may increase the flexibility 
of the system – especially on the demand side – by 
unleashing the potential for electrification via flexible 
load units with ramping capabilities such as electric 
boilers in heating systems, electrolysers in power-to-
gas or smart charging of electric vehicles (Skytte et al., 
2017a; Ropenus and Skytte, 2007). 
Though increased flexibility, thanks to cross-
sectoral coupling, will play a key role in reaching 
decarbonisation targets, the right market design will be 
required to ensure a high level of short-term reliability 
and long-term capacity adequacy at the lowest cost.
Price setting in energy 
markets
In most of the present power markets, the wholesale 
electricity price is determined according to the 
marginal cost of the last dispatched generation plant 
(see left panel in Figure 2). It has been shown to be 
a very effective market design that so far has entailed 
energy prices that both support optimal dispatch/
short-term reliability (Skytte and Grohnheit, 2017) 
and optimal investment/long-term capacity adequacy 
(Biggar and Hesamzadeh, 2014; Green, 2006; 
Schweppe et al., 1988). Although only energy is traded 
on the power markets, flexibility is valued, as demand 
and generation units with flexible ramping capabilities 
can make a better business case in volatile markets, 
compared with slow ramping units.
The success of the existing design also must be seen in 
the context of a large deployment of renewable energy-
based capacity. This capacity has received additional 
financial support from outside the market, resulting 
in overcapacity on the supply side. Therefore, there 
is presently limited need for additional investment 
in conventional generation capacity. Nonetheless, 
with increased demand from sector coupling and the 
phasing out of fossil-based generation, additional 
generation capacity will be needed in the future. 
Simultaneously, support for renewables will be phased 
out in accordance with the maturing of technologies 
and it can be expected that future deployment will be 
mainly market-based (Skytte, 2000; Skytte, 2006; van 
Kuik et al., 2016). 
In a period with scarce supply – e.g., when the residual 
demand is large due to little wind or solar production 
and with simultaneously high demand – the price in 
the power market is likely to be set by the marginal 
consumer benefit (see right panel in Figure 2). This is 
called scarcity pricing. Scarcity is a necessary (although 
not a sufficient) condition for a well-functioning market 
and optimal allocation of resources – often referred to 
as the first principle of micro-economics. The main 
dilemma in the power market is that the current 
demand side is relatively price-inelastic (the demand 
Figure 1: Goals and framework of the future energy market
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curve D in Figure 2 is almost vertical), which implies 
that it is hard to determine a sufficient scarcity price. 
We call this missing flexibility on the consumer side the 
missing consumer problem, which may imply that the 
price does not reflect the marginal consumer benefit 
or, at worst, that an equilibrium between demand and 
supply cannot be found. Within energy economics, the 
marginal consumer benefit in scarcity periods is often 
estimated as the value of lost load (VOLL) for marginal 
consumers, i.e., the amount they are willing to pay to 
avoid a disruption in their electricity supply.
Electrification and sector coupling will increase 
electricity demand and might also increase the 
availability of flexible load units with ramping 
capabilities – and, thus, the marginal price elasticity 
needed to solve the missing consumer problem. 
However, the problem of determining an efficient 
level of scarcity pricing also affects the supply side. 
If the estimated VOLL is set too low, investments in 
new capacity may be withdrawn, leaving the market 
unable to ensure long-term adequacy. Lower prices in 
the power market increase the need for higher scarcity 
prices to ensure investment, as a low price level implies 
that a large share of the revenue to cover the investment 
costs must come from scarcity periods, when the price 
is higher than the marginal cost of the last generating 
unit (right panel in Figure 2). 
VRE, such as wind and solar, will be the main suppliers of 
electricity in the future, as more controllable renewable 
energy-based technologies such as hydropower and 
biomass involve more limited resources or are subject 
to restrictions on further deployment. The dominance 
of low marginal cost VRE technologies implies low 
average prices on the wholesale markets (Skytte and 
Grohnheit, 2017). As mentioned above, a low price 
level, combined with insufficient scarcity prices, could 
imply that potential investments in new capacity 
are withdrawn (Joskow, 2008; Joskow and Tirole, 
2007). This is called the missing money problem, i.e., 
the revenues in the energy market will not cover the 
needed investments in new capacity, thereby failing 
to ensure the long-term adequacy of the system. In 
addition, price caps have been implemented in many 
markets to protect consumers from high peak prices 
that might result from market forces. Such price caps 
will limit scarcity prices and contribute to the missing 
money problem. 
Need for re-design
The existing market design and its marginal pricing, 
with a few minor adjustments, works in most cases. 
However, in the event of scarcity, there is a need for 
better scarcity pricing to solve the missing consumer 
and missing money problems. 
The general problem is that market imperfections exist 
in the power market (Skytte, 1999). In addition, the 
uncertainty of future prices increases risks for investors 
and may, as a consequence, hinder new investments. 
Better risk-hedging possibilities for investors, in 
addition to the existing forward and other financial 
markets, may be required. 
Therefore, we do not support capacity mechanisms 
just to have enough capacity available, but rather to fix 
Figure 2: Price setting on the power market (RES = renewable energy sources)
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the existing scarcity-pricing problem in the energy-
only market – with as little interference from market 
mechanisms as possible – and to reduce investment 
risk.
In this paper, we propose a combination consisting of a 
premium that enforces scarcity prices and a mechanism 
that, to a certain extent, mitigates the risk on the 
investor side and effectively shares it with consumers. 
The constructed mechanisms draw on Hogan (2013) 
and Cramton et al. (2013). We introduce a premium 
in scarcity periods, and we also allow generators to sell 
reliability options that reduce their risk of investment. 
These two instruments work concurrently, with the 
premium increasing the revenue of generators, while 
the reliability options allow generators to swap revenue 
from the few high-price periods with a stable, risk-
free payment. The following subsections describe the 
premium and reliability options in turn.
Ensuring scarcity prices 
with premiums
One should seek a re-design of the energy markets that 
respects the first principle of economics in terms of 
scarcity. One way to do this is to strengthen scarcity 
prices through a premium based on the VOLL and the 
loss of load probability (LOLP). 
At times of high demand in the energy spot market, 
there will most often be sufficient capacity to clear 
the market because the system typically will contain 
a certain capacity margin. In this situation, there will 
be no scarcity and prices will stay at moderate levels, 
presumably at the short-run marginal cost of the most 
expensive unit in the market (left panel in Figure 2). 
The high demand for capacity may, however, create a 
tense situation regarding operating reserves that are 
retained at any given time to deal with unexpected 
events, such as a sudden increase in electricity demand 
or the loss of a generator or transmission line. Typically, 
the system operator would define an inelastic demand 
for operating reserves. When the reserve market does 
not clear itself, the only solution might be to shed load 
or to use other out-of-market transactions, both of 
which will not be reflected in the operating reserve or 
the spot-market prices. By defining a proper demand 
curve, such issues could be prevented and scarcity 
signals could be sent to all market participants. 
We propose using a downward-sloping, operating-
reserve demand curve (Figure 3), which is determined 
by the expected value of lost load (i.e., the product of 
loss of load probability and value of lost load; LOLP 
by VOLL) at any given time (Hogan, 2013). The more 
capacity available for operating reserves, the lower the 
LOLP, yielding the slope in the demand for reserves. 
This translates into an implicit premium (“price adder”) 
on top of the electricity price in scarcity periods (right 
illustration in Figure 3). The underlying assumption 
is that generators will be able to either supply energy 
to the spot market or stay available for reserves. 
With rising demand in the spot market, the available 
capacity for reserves will be smaller. Due to the shape 
of the operating reserve-demand curve, this may result 
in sharply rising reserve prices. Therefore, in scarcity 
periods, when the probability of loss of load is high, 
Figure 3: The downward-sloping Operating Reserve-Demand Curve (left figure) as a basis for a 
scarcity premium on energy prices (right figure)
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the implicit premium is correspondingly high, while 
in other periods, in which the probability is negligible, 
the premium is close to zero.
The resulting premiums provide generators with 
additional revenue, improving the incentive to invest in 
new capacity (mitigating the missing money problem) 
and at the same time providing a stronger price signal 
to the demand side, to which the consumers can react. 
However, the scarcity premium does not remove 
investor risk due to the uncertainty of future prices. 
Therefore, it is not certain whether the mechanism 
ensures sufficient capacity in practice. It could still be an 
important adjustment to the existing operating reserve 
markets, as the short-term price signals become more 
precise. While the profitability of investments would be 
improved, the cash-flow timing and investment risk are 
not addressed. We introduce reliability options to bridge 
the remaining gap to achieve adequate investments. 
Reliability options
Reliability options allow generators to swap revenue 
from a few scarcity periods with a stable, risk-free 
payment. We propose that the system operator 
organises annual auctions to buy a predetermined 
number of reliability options (corresponding to the 
expected future capacity needs) with a predetermined 
strike price and a time horizon that allows for the 
introduction of new capacity. When a generator sells a 
reliability option, it will still receive the spot price for 
the energy it produces, but only in those hours when 
the spot price is lower than the strike price (see Figure 
4). In all other hours (scarcity periods), it receives the 
strike price for the energy it produces. Note that in 
our case, the spot price includes the implicit premium 
stemming from the demand for operating reserves. 
In addition, the generator earns the selling price of 
the reliability options. Thus, the generator swaps the 
revenue it would have earned during the infrequent 
high price periods (i.e., above strike price) with a stable 
and risk-free payment for the reliability option. While 
the option payments compensate for the price risk 
during scarcity periods, market participants will still 
be fully exposed to price variations below the strike 
price. Standard forward contracts might, therefore, be 
used as a supplement to manage price risk below the 
strike price.
The advantage of reliability options is that they 
maintain the incentive for generators to produce 
electricity in scarcity periods, as the system operator 
sets the strike price such that it is above the marginal 
cost of the most expensive generation unit (resembling 
the scarcity situation in the right panel of Figure 2). 
Thus, any generator will earn a positive profit from 
producing electricity at the strike price. Just as under 
the option contract, a generator is obliged to pay the 
difference between spot and strike price whenever the 
strike price is exceeded, not producing in such an event 
will produce significant losses – a strong incentive to 
provide full capacity during scarcity events.
System reliability can, to a certain degree, be considered 
a public good. Improving reliability benefits all 
consumers because load curtailment at the individual 
level is currently not widely available. Thus, consumers 
have an incentive to free-ride and let others pay for 
improved system reliability. For this reason, we propose 
that system operators purchase reliability options 
on behalf of all consumers in a centralised auction 
and distribute the cost according to their respective 
shares of the load. In exchange, consumers receive a 
hedge against high electricity prices and inadequate 
capacity. This hedge against price peaks will have the 
same objective as present price caps which most likely 
Figure 4: Reliability options and the spot and strike prices
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will be removed in the future power market in order to 
allow for scarcity prices. Finally, from the point in time 
when the reliability option is sold until the contract 
takes effect, a few years will pass. This will allow new 
capacity to compete with existing capacity, as there will 
be time to construct new capacity between the auction 
and the delivery period. 
If load curtailment at the individual level becomes 
widely available, the centralised auction can be 
replaced with a market for reliability options, in which 
consumers can decide whether to buy or not. If they 
decide not to purchase, they will accept the risk being 
curtailed in case of scarcity.
Discussion
Why choose our proposed scarcity premium and 
reliability options instead of traditional capacity-
remuneration mechanisms? Different capacity-
remuneration mechanisms (Table 1) are often 
mentioned during discussions about adequacy 
concerns and as a means to minimise investor risk. 
However, conventional strategic reserves and capacity 
payments or markets (capacity obligations or auctions) 
exhibit some deficiencies that regulators prefer to avoid 
(Finon and Pignon, 2008; Traber, 2017). Strategic 
reserves, for instance, remunerate capacity, so that it 
remains available and can be dispatched in times of 
scarcity. Typically, strategic reserves are mainly targeted 
at existing capacity and do not have a direct impact on 
new investments. As a long-term mechanism to ensure 
adequacy, they are, thus, not applicable. Among other 
capacity-remuneration mechanisms, reliability options 
have an advantage in that contracted capacity provides 
a distinct incentive to be available during periods of 
scarcity, while it does not profit from extreme energy 
prices directly (Cramton et al., 2013). Therefore, 
potential issues with market power in the energy spot 
market can be avoided to some extent.
Texas has implemented a variant of scarcity prices 
based on the operating reserve demand curve (ERCOT 
2014), while a variant of reliability options has been 
implemented in the Colombian electricity market 
and in New England (Ausubel and Cramton 2010). 
However, to our knowledge, no one has combined the 
two approaches yet. 
Throughout this paper, we assume a future in which 
large-scale electricity storage remains prohibitively 
costly, and commercial and residential demand-side 
response is limited. It is worth noting that the proposed 
mechanism can fall back to an energy-only market if a 
different future materialises. That is, if the loss of load 
probability is zero, the premium vanishes. Similarly, 
if storage or demand-side response completely 
eliminates price spikes and increases the average spot 
price, reliability options would lose their value as well. 
Thus, the proposed mechanism is not path-dependent, 
but easily reversible.
In theory, neither the premium nor the reliability 
options distort short-term dispatch incentives. 
However, further research is needed to determine how 
forecast errors by the system operator affect the market, 
i.e., forecast errors in the expected value of lost load, 
expected future capacity need, or marginal cost of the 
most-expensive generation unit. Further research is 
also needed to determine the exact interaction between 
the two mechanisms.
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Challenges
The steadiness with which the European Union has 
pursed its ambitious Roadmap 2050 policy objectives 
[EC11] is an encouraging sign in the backdrop of a 
highly uncertain future for global energy policy. Despite 
the upheaval of environmentally-minded policies in 
the United States following the Trump election, the 
damage that the Trump administration can inflict on 
the global renewable energy and electricity market 
transformation agenda is expected to be limited as 
a result of major technological innovations, global 
market forces and the general momentum of EU policy 
makers towards de-carbonization and decentralization 
of the electricity industry [B17].
In this context, we identify the following major 
challenges for the decarbonized European electricity 
markets of 2050: (i) the shifting of value from energy 
markets to services in a near-zero-marginal-cost 
market; (ii) the lack of harmonization between regional 
markets and between time frames; (iii) the need to 
mobilize distributed resources; and (iv) the need 
to engage demand-side resources through scalable 
aggregator business models.
Proposal
The following four pillars are proposed as a means of 
overcoming the challenges mentioned in the previous 
section.
Pillar One: Real-time markets and scarcity pricing. 
The large-scale integration of renewable resources 
shifts value away from energy markets and into markets 
for ancillary services, and especially reserve markets. 
The central role of reserve markets in power systems 
dominated by renewables implies that reserves need to 
be valued accurately by the demand side. Due to the 
fundamental arbitrage relationship that links energy 
market opportunity costs to reserve capacity prices, 
a consistent pricing of reserve capacity will result 
in an adjustment of energy prices so as to accurately 
represent real-time scarcity. It is therefore important 
to value reserve capacity in real-time markets in a way 
that is consistent with system operation: increments 
of reserve under tight conditions are more highly 
valued by system operators than increments under 
comfortable system conditions, because they have a 
greater effect in reducing loss of load probability under 
scarcity.
Scarcity pricing already exists in certain European 
systems, for example in the Belgian market the 
imbalance price is corrected by a constant offset 
whenever the system is exceedingly long (above +120 
MW) or short (below -120 MW). There is a sound 
economic theory [H05, H13] that can be developed 
in order to support this form of scarcity pricing. The 
fundamental ingredient of such a theory requires 
introducing a reserve capacity demand function. The 
introduction of operating reserve demand functions is 
predicated on the simultaneous clearing of energy and 
reserves, and the trading of real-time reserve capacity, 
which is currently absent in European energy markets. 
The resulting scarcity adder which is the real-time 
price for reserve capacity also corrects the real-time 
price for reserve energy, and is a price signal which 
rewards resources that support the system in real-
time balancing while penalizing those resources that 
cause real-time imbalances. Ultimately, the proposed 
design results in price jumps of lower amplitude, and 
more predictable frequency. The correction of energy 
prices under conditions of scarcity can occur even if 
bids are mitigated due to regulatory concerns over the 
exercise of market power. The approach respects the 
fundamental design of an energy-only market, thereby 
safeguarding the integration of the common European 
energy-only market. At the same time, the design of 
such a demand function, coupled with a consistent day-
ahead forward market, ensures the back-propagation 
28
of long-term investment signals that can support the 
expansion of much-needed flexible capacity. There is 
nothing to preclude the coexistence of the proposed 
mechanism with capacity remuneration schemes. 
However, the successful design and implementation of 
the proposed mechanism would render any capacity 
remuneration scheme less critical and, therefore, 
would mitigate some of its unintended consequences. 
Pillar Two: Alignment of real-time and day-ahead 
markets. The design of a harmonized real-time market 
that simultaneously clears energy, reserve capacity 
and transmission capacity needs to be accompanied 
with a consistent day-ahead market design. Lack 
of consistency creates gaming opportunities, and 
introduces operating inefficiencies. Under some 
conditions, as experience from the USA market 
indicates, this lack of consistency between the markets 
can be detrimental to their efficient functioning and, 
more importantly, to the reliability of the system at a 
huge expense to consumers. Therefore, we propose 
a transition from the existing day-ahead power 
exchange towards the simultaneous auctioning of 
energy, reserves and transmission capacity in the day-
ahead time frame. The integration of reserves and 
energy in market clearing allows for a more granular 
sizing of reserves, a more efficient commitment of 
thermal generators, and a correct pricing of reserve 
capacity which becomes the main service offered by 
thermal generators to the grid. The latter creates the 
opportunity for the introduction of improved scarcity 
pricing, as discussed under pillar one. The clearing of 
transmission with a proper representation of physical 
constraints within the auction allows the mitigation 
of congestion management costs, the coordination 
of resources from different areas to balance out local 
renewable supply fluctuations, and the seamless 
sharing of reserve capacity.
Pillar Three: Coordination schemes for TSO-DSO 
operations. Although pillars one and two clarify how a 
wholesale market for energy, reserves and transmission 
would operate, the corresponding market design 
still conforms to a passive utilization of distributed 
resources. Under such a paradigm, distributed 
consumers absorb power at will and distributed 
energy resources inject power into the distribution 
system whenever primary energy is available. Instead, 
with the advent of distributed storage, the system 
can be handled more intelligently, thereby deferring 
infrastructure upgrades and improving operational 
efficiency significantly. Whereas the status quo places 
all the intelligence in, and sources all flexibility from, 
the high-voltage transmission grid resources, we 
envision a coordinated, active dispatch of transmission 
and distribution resources.
The proper coordination of transmission and 
distribution resources requires a clear definition of 
how transmission system operators will coordinate 
with distribution system operators in an  energy 
system dominated by renewables. The focus here is on 
being able to utilize distributed resources as reserve, 
while respecting the constraints of the distribution 
network. A range of TSO-DSO coordination schemes 
can be envisioned, each of which would need to be 
explored more carefully for its relative merits and 
disadvantages. Under a fully coordinated dispatch of 
transmission and distribution level resources, there 
exist approximations and relaxations of the physical 
constraints governing power flows in both the high-
voltage grid as well as the sub-transmission and 
distribution system which capture the non-linearity 
of power flows while remaining computationally 
tractable [FL13]. These relaxations properly account 
for the non-linearity of distribution grids, reactive 
power flows, voltage constraints and real power losses, 
features which cannot be ignored at the distribution 
level, while preserving a computationally tractable 
model. The idea of the fully coordinated dispatch of 
distributed resources with transmission resources is to 
have the transmission system operator operate reserves 
at both the transmission as well as the distribution level 
while accounting for distribution level constraints. 
Although this may appear as a daunting task due to 
the size of the problem and its non-linearity, recent 
evolutions in decomposition algorithms render this 
vision possibly achievable with highly distributed 
computing infrastructure [K+13]. From a market 
design point of view, this effectively corresponds to the 
simultaneous trading of distribution network capacity, 
reactive power and reserve capacity in a simultaneous 
auction that is cleared by the system operator. Such an 
auction produces a distribution locational marginal 
price which accounts for the contribution of limited 
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line capacity, real power losses, reactive power losses, 
and binding voltage constraints to the formation of 
real power prices at individual distribution nodes 
[P17]. Alternatively, if such an approach cannot be 
implemented due to governance or other regulatory 
constraints, it is possible to decompose the problem 
and solve it sequentially. The decomposition is best 
facilitated by simultaneously computing prices for the 
entire TSO meshed portion of the network, before 
propagating down to radial network branches using 
local distribution markets. Our objective in this case is 
to compute and communicate prices that are consistent 
with one another without resorting to a massive, 
centralized optimization process. 
Pillar four: Priority service. With a properly 
functioning short-term market in place and a clear 
definition of proactive distribution system operations, it 
is possible to determine new value streams for demand-
side flexibility, provided consumers are confronted with 
scalable aggregator business models. Our proposed 
solution for mobilizing consumer flexibility is based 
on the premise that consumers perceive electricity 
as a service, instead of a commodity that they are 
willing to purchase in a real-time market. Inspired by 
the successful paradigm of other sectors, including 
telecommunications and information technology, 
we propose a paradigm which combines the best of 
both price-based and quantity-based control, while 
respecting the requirement of consumers for privacy, 
control and simplicity. As in the case of popular 
business models for telecommunications, consumers 
value transparent offerings. We propose an offering 
of electricity at various levels of reliability, which we 
argue consumers can value accurately, as opposed to 
their valuation for increments of power in real time. 
In practice, our proposal is implemented as follows 
[PBF13]: aggregators offer slices of power at different 
reliability levels, with higher levels of reliability 
corresponding to a higher price. Consumers then 
choose the amount of power that they wish to procure 
at each level of reliability. They can further set colour 
tags on each plug in their home (see figure 1), in order 
to prioritize the consumption of power in different 
devices. Since slices with lower reliability are priced 
lower, they allow consumers to pocket the benefits of 
their flexibility, something which is largely impossible 
under existing retail tariffs. At the same time, 
consumers preserve control of their devices, because 
they can decide how to colour-tag devices throughout 
their home. Aggregators can collect this information 
over hundreds of thousands of households and apply 
stochastic distributed control strategies that allow 
for a rapid regulation of aggregate residential and 
commercial consumption. Since different colour 
tags correspond to different levels of reliability and 
valuations of power, the colour tags suggest the order in 
which devices need to be curtailed: in case of shortage 
the aggregator curtails devices in order of increasing 
reliability. The bidding of the load slices in the market 
is also straightforward, since the aggregator simply 
needs to utilize the price duration curve of the market 
in order to determine the offer price for power slices 
corresponding to different levels of reliability.
The challenge on the end of the aggregator is to design 
a menu with asymmetric information (i.e. without 
knowing how individual consumers value power, 
thereby respecting privacy), while ensuring that 
the reliability a renewable-based energy system can 
afford is the reliability that the consumers are entitled 
to through their reliability choices. There exists solid 
economic theory to guide the optimal design of 
such reliability-differentiated menus, either through 
capacity-based tariffs [CW87] or capacity and energy-
based tariffs [C+86], while having the aggregator rely 
Figure 1: Illustration of a smart plug. Different 
colours of the switch correspond to different 
reliability levels. Source: http://mitei.mit.edu/
news/ tomorrows-power-grid
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on aggregate statistical information about the valuation 
of the population for power, a prerequisite which is 
clearly realistic.
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Introduction
Climate change is widely recognised as one of the 
major environmental problems the world is facing 
today. Investments in energy efficiency and low 
carbon energy technologies combat global climate 
change and promote a sustainable development. The 
European Union (EU) has taken the leadership in the 
mitigation of climate change since the establishment 
of an Emissions Trading System (EU-ETS) in 2005. 
More recently, the EU has raised its ambitions in the 
Energy Roadmap 2050, where a 80-95% reduction in 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions is foreseen by the 
middle of this century.1
The roadmap indicates several routes that can be 
undertaken to attain a more sustainable, secure 
and competitive energy system. These routes are 
characterised by investments in renewable energy 
sources (RES), in gas-fired power plants, nuclear 
energy, and in efficient technologies such as those 
based on “carbon capture and storage”. Among them, 
the integration of RES in the European power system 
represents a key point, since more than 30% of the total 
GHG emissions are due today to electricity generation. 
However, electricity production from wind and sun, 
although more mature from a technological point 
of view, is still difficult to predict because it depends 
on intermittent sources that introduce high levels of 
variability and uncertainty in system planning and 
operation. On the other hand, renewable technologies 
such as concentrating solar power (CSP) and offshore 
wind, which suffer less from intermittency, are 
1  https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/energy-strategy-
and-energy-union/2050-energy-strategy
currently less developed and their investment costs are 
subject to high uncertainty. 
The achievement of the European environmental 
targets is also influenced by the market design of the 
energy system. The liberalization of the European 
electricity market started with Directive 96/92/EC and 
then Directive 2003/54/EC. However, the creation of 
an efficient and flexible internal market, as pursued 
by the Third Legislative Package in 2009,2 the related 
Network Codes3 and the so-called “Winter Package”4 
is still under way. 
In this paper we consider this complex framework 
where EU environmental policies, power production 
processes and electricity market design are strictly 
interrelated. In particular, we focus on the operation 
of a renewable-dominated power system in Europe. 
Specifically, we propose a fully integrated EU market 
for 2050 where energy and reserve capacity are 
simultaneously dispatched in the day-ahead market, 
taking properly into account the uncertainty related to 
the power production from RES and the consumption 
level. The numerical analysis is based on realistic data 
for 24 European countries and is conducted considering 
the cross-border limitations among Member States.
Market design
In this paper, we present a market design in which 
energy and reserve capacity are scheduled in a 
coordinated way in the day-ahead market. The market 
design proposed takes into consideration, for real-time 
operation, the variability of the electricity consumption 
and the intermittent production from renewables. 
We applied this model to the European electricity 
market for 2050, based on the projections made by the 
European Commission and the actual data provided 
by ENTSO-E for the 24 countries participating in the 
Price Coupling of Regions (PCR) project.5 
The proposed market design is based on the 
assumptions described below.
2  http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?
uri=CELEX:32009L0072&from=en
3  http://networkcodes.entsoe.eu/ 
4  https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/news/commission-
proposes-new-rules-consumer-centred-clean-energy-transition 
5  https://www.epexspot.com/en/market-coupling/pcr
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Assumptions
• The 24 countries considered are those currently 
coupled through the PCR plus Switzerland, 
namely: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Den-
mark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hun-
gary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, the UK and 
Switzerland. Each country is modelled as a single 
node in the network. The interconnection capac-
ity among countries is that projected by ENTSO-
E for 2030.6
• We consider that both the energy and reserve 
markets are cleared simultaneously in the day 
ahead of delivery (D-1) for the 24 countries, con-
sidering their cross-border limitations.
• The market design comprises two stages: the first 
stage represents the day-ahead market, where 
energy and reserve capacity are scheduled for the 
24 hours of the following day; the second stage 
represents the balancing market, where upward/
downward reserves are deployed to counteract the 
deviations from what forecasted for the consump-
tion and the renewable power production.
• Furthermore, minimum upward/downward re-
serve capacity requirements are imposed for the 
whole system in each hour, which correspond to 
3% of the forecasted consumption and 5% of the 
forecasted renewable production.
• The generating system comprises the following 
technologies: nuclear (Nucl), coal, combined-
cycle gas turbine (CCGT), hydroelectric with res-
ervoir (HRes), run-of-river hydroelectric (HRoR), 
onshore/offshore wind (Wons/Woff), solar photo-
voltaic (SoPV), concentrating solar power (SoTH) 
and biomass (Biom). 
• All generating units can provide upward/down-
ward reserve capacity except for the nuclear 
power plants. The cost of scheduling reserve 
capacity is 1% of their operating cost.
• Energy storage units, such as pumped storage or 
large-scale batteries, are included and considered 
6  http://tyndp.entsoe.eu/ 
as a resource for the TSO to maintain the reli-
ability of the system (they can provide reserve 
services). 
• The demand level and the wind and solar power 
production are considered as uncertain pa-
rameters. Stochastic programming is used to 
model the decision-making process regarding the 
uncertainty introduced by those parameters.7 The 
values of the uncertain parameters are represent-
ed through a set of scenarios. The scenarios are 
generated using historical data from ENTSO-E.8
Model description
The proposed market design is modelled through an 
optimization problem that seeks to minimize the total 
operating cost of scheduling energy and reserve in the 
day-ahead market and the expected cost of deviations 
in the balancing market. Specifically, the model is 
formulated as a two-stage stochastic-programming 
problem where the first stage represents the day-ahead 
market and the second stage represents the balancing 
market. 
The constraints included in the proposed model are as 
follows:
• The power balance in the day-ahead and the 
balancing markets is imposed in each hour and in 
each node of the network, and in each scenario in 
the balancing market (scenarios are only consid-
ered in the balancing market, not in the day-
ahead market);
• Capacity and ramping limits are imposed to the 
thermal and hydroelectric units. The maximum 
power output of renewable units, such as wind 
and solar, is limited by the  primary energy avail-
able in each hour;
• The power that can be interchanged among coun-
tries is also limited;
• The constraints included to represent the storage 
operation comprise: the energy balance in the 
storage, the capacity and the charge/discharge 
7  Birge J. R., and F. Louveaux (1997), Introduction to 
stochastic programming, New York: Springer-Verlag.
8  https://transparency.entsoe.eu/ 
33
limits of the storage, and the minimum energy 
level in the storage at the end of the day;
• Minimum upward/downward reserve require-
ments are imposed based on the projection of the 
electricity consumption and the renewable power 
production in the day-ahead;
• The deployed reserves in the balancing market are 
limited to the scheduled reserves in the day-ahead 
market.
Due to space limitation the mathematical formulation 
is not provided, but the proposed model is similar to 
what presented in related papers.9,10
Numerical results
All the data used in this work were mainly collected 
from ENTSO-E.11 The webpages of the system 
operators of Norway, Switzerland and the UK were 
also consulted to complete the data. 
A list with the main assumptions considered to carry 
out the numerical analysis follows:
• We assume that the electricity consumption 
in 2050 will be 25% higher than that of 2016, 
coherently with the projections of the European 
Commission;12
• The total generating capacity of the system in 
2050 is assumed to be 1442.8 GW, being 66% re-
newable. The percentages per installed technology 
are: nuclear 6%, coal 3%, CCGT 18%, hydroelec-
tric 12%, onshore wind 30%, offshore wind 1%, 
solar PV 24%, CSP 0.5%, and biomass 5% (total 
generating capacity considered for 2016 is 818.4 
GW, being 43% renewable);
• The energy storage capacity in each country cor-
responds to 10% of the average daily electricity 
consumption in 2016;
9  Domínguez R., A.J. Conejo, and M. Carrión (2014), 
Operation of a fully renewable electric energy system with CSP 
plants, Applied Energy, vol. 119, pp. 417-430.
10  Morales J.M., A.J. Conejo, and J. Pérez-Ruiz (2009), 
Economic valuation of reserves in power systems with high 
penetration of wind power, IEEE Transaction on Power Systems, 
vol. 24(2), pp. 900-910.
11  https://transparency.entsoe.eu/ 
12  https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/data-analysis/energy-
modelling
• The real-time scenarios were generated applying 
the forecast error observed during 2016 between 
the prediction for D-1 provided by ENTSO-E and 
the actual realization, for each hour and in each 
country. Therefore, the same demand curve and 
renewable power availability factors are applied to 
the generating capacity systems of 2016 and 2050, 
respectively. Note that demand in 2050 is adjust-
ed, considering the expected demand growth;
• Investment and operating costs are taken from 
the reports of the International Energy Agency.13 
 
Specifically, in this section we analyse the system 
operation in two different ways:
• First, we consider a representative day of 2016 
in terms of net demand. The day is selected over 
the 366 days of 2016 using a scenario reduction 
technique that evaluates the net demand, namely 
the daily electricity consumption minus the 
wind and solar power production. The resulting 
representative day is September 2nd. Specifically, 
we take the demand curve and renewable power 
availability factors of this day  to analyse the EU 
power system both in 2016 and 2050, taking into 
account the generating capacity and the demand 
growth in each year.
• Second, the system operation for the whole year 
considering the generating capacity of 2050. 
 
The main results obtained from this analysis are 
described below. All the figures in the following 
compare the results obtained without (left hand) and 
with (right hand) storage capacity, respectively.
First, we provide the results obtained considering a 
representative day of the year, namely September 2nd, 
as indicated above.
Figure 1 depicts the day-ahead energy scheduling in 
the whole system for that day in 2050. As comparison, 
Figure 2 represents the day-ahead energy scheduling 
in the same day, with the generating capacity of 2016. 
The main results are: first, the energy mix in 2050 will 
expectedly be less carbon-intense than the current one; 
second, solar PV units will play a relevant role to attain 
13  http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/weomodel/ 
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the emission reduction targets; third, the availability 
of storage capacity allows a better integration of 
intermittent renewable production, especially in a 
RES-based system as that in 2050.
Additionally, Figures 3 and 4 depict the reserve 
capacity scheduled per technology in the day ahead for 
the generating system of 2050 and 2016, respectively. 
Comparing these figures, we observe that higher reserve 
capacity is required in 2050 than in 2016 because there 
is more intermittent renewable production. If available, 
storage units will provide high reserve capacity.
To conclude this first analysis, we provide Figure 5 that 
depicts the renewable power curtailment in that day in 
2050 with (right) and without (left) storage capacity. 
As expected, comparatively less power production is 
curtailed if storage capacity is available. 
Second, we simulated the system operation for the 365 
days of the year considering the generating capacity 
system of 2050. The results show the system operation 
with and without storage capacity. 
Figure 6 depicts the day-ahead energy scheduling in 
each month of 2050. These figures show that there 
is more wind power production in the cold season, 
whereas in hot season the lack of wind is compensated 
by solar power production.
Moreover, Figure 7 shows that the reserve capacity 
requirement is higher in those months with higher 
wind power production. Biomass and CSP units 
provide high reserve capacity to the system. If storage 
units are available, they provide high reserve capacity 
and make the system more flexible.
On the other hand, Figure 8 provides the mean, 
minimum and maximum electricity price attained 
in each month of 2050 with and without considering 
storage capacity. In the case without storage capacity 
we find a couple of months with negative minimum 
prices. However, if storage capacity is available, no 
negative prices are found, whereas maximum prices 
are slightly lower during the year.
Finally, Table 1 provides the rate of expected profits in 
k€/MW attained per technology in each country (note 
that the blank spaces are for those countries without 
capacity of that technology). The profits are computed 
as the difference between the incomes received from 
providing energy and capacity to the system minus 
the variable and annualized investment costs. From 
the results provided in Table 1, we can highlight the 
good economic results attained by nuclear, hydro, and 
biomass units, in general. Other units, such as CCGT 
or offshore wind, get into losses in some countries. 
In the case of CCGT units this is due to their high 
operating costs and their low load factor, whereas the 
high investment costs are the reason of the negative 
results for offshore wind units.
Conclusions
The main conclusions obtained from this analysis are 
as follows:
• Jointly scheduling energy and reserve capacity 
in all European countries allows for an efficient 
integration of the renewable power production, 
which is a crucial point in the decarbonized energy 
system expected for 2050;
• Electricity prices in the day-ahead market in 
2050 will be comparatively lower than the current 
ones. However, generating units will recover their 
expenses and are expected to make profits in in 
every country, except for the CCGT and offshore 
wind units that may need an uplift;
• The availability of energy storage capacity allows 
for a reduction in operating costs, by providing 
more flexibility to the system;
• Comparing the energy mix in 2016 and 2050 for 
the electricity consumption projected for 2050, 
it is observable the large reduction in the CO2 
emissions;
• The proposed model allows to jointly clearing 
energy and reserves in the whole European system 
in short computational times.
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(K€/MW) NUCL COAL CCGT HRES HROR WONS WOFF SOPV SOTH BIOM
AT - 68.69 2.42 5.29 70.06 36.99 - 25.76 - 133.53
BE - - 0.91 - 19.12 38.86 37.40 27.69 - 187.85
CH 143.50 - - 23.34 67.89 196.00 - 211.86 - 160.00
CZ 88.67 36.54 0.22 3.06 32.12 26.07 - 15.67 - 105.78
DE - 48.62 0.18 4.77 78.70 24.22 0.05 15.32 - 122.98
DK - 66.71 1.28 - 0.00 21.49 -5.40 22.38 - 119.62
EE - 63.30 -0.10 - 70.00 24.61 - 160.00 - 131.96
ES - 30.02 -0.09 0.33 59.98 9.88 - 9.56 90.08 58.23
FI 122.27 69.06 -0.07 - 98.63 47.51 53.00 192.00 - 136.13
FR 4.15 3.04 -0.10 0.09 14.57 11.44 -0.38 17.34 - 13.60
HU 109.32 58.60 0.29 3.05 64.03 32.33 - -0.14 - 123.81
IT - 34.87 0.09 2.71 81.57 22.06 - 14.18 113.20 79.90
LT 108.59 - 0.00 2.44 53.52 38.96 - 16.29 - 124.21
LU - - 3.38 - 14.29 28.55 - 17.54 - 124.03
LV - 56.71 0.00 - 32.31 33.75 - 175.87 - 127.01
NL - 90.61 0.69 - 0.00 37.30 45.00 26.46 - 170.53
NR - - 0.00 0.64 -0.37 53.06 56.00 - - -
PL 93.62 36.66 0.32 4.70 70.36 27.68 - 0.00 - 108.29
PT - - 0.00 1.02 28.57 16.53 - 17.78 90.38 58.78
RO 101.38 48.91 -0.03 0.88 76.80 31.86 - 19.27 - 116.47
SE 126.15 75.19 0.02 2.18 - 52.71 - 194.93 - 141.40
SI 90.15 42.40 0.85 - 61.71 -0.29 - 12.73 - 106.95
SK 98.77 42.97 0.00 2.25 76.12 38.02 - 19.45 - 113.07
UK 27.00 19.20 0.45 4.95 -0.37 11.48 -40.45 10.72 - 44.40
EU 56.50 45.08 0.29 2.38 54.03 21.32 0.30 15.35 93.51 87.45
Table 1: Rate of profits in k€/MW per technology in each country
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Figure 1: Day-ahead energy scheduling on the 2nd of September of 2050 without (left hand) and 
with (right hand) storage capacity
Figure 2: Day-ahead energy scheduling on the 2nd of September of 2016 without (left hand) and 
with (right hand) storage capacity
Figure 3: Reserve capacity scheduling on the 2nd of September of 2050 without (left hand) and 
with (right hand) storage capacity
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Figure 4: Reserve capacity scheduling on the 2nd of September of 2016 without (left hand) and with 
(right hand) storage capacity
Figure 5: Power spillage on the 2nd of September of 2050 without (left hand) and with (right hand) 
storage capacity
Figure 6: Monthly day-ahead energy scheduling in 2050 without (left hand) and with (right hand) 
storage capacity
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Figure 7: Monthly day-ahead reserve capacity scheduling in 2050 without (left hand) and with 
(right hand) storage capacity
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Figure 8: Monthly mean, minimum and maximum prices in 2050 without (left hand) and with 
(right hand) storage capacity
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ELECTRICITY 
MARKET REDESIGN – 
FROM A DISTORTED 
SHORT-RUN TO A 
COMPETITIVE LONG-
RUN MARGINAL 
PRICE-SETTING 
MECHANISM 
Christian Grenz
Introduction 
Over almost two decades of electricity market 
liberalisation – a market price-setting mechanism based 
on short run marginal costs (SRMC) – has delivered a 
competitive and economically viable electricity supply. 
However, given the steadily growing share of renewable 
energy sources (RES) with near-zero SRMC, it is most 
unlikely that the profit contribution would be sufficient 
to investors in long-term capital-intensive projects as 
those in the electricity sector usually are. A delivery of 
efficient and effective outcomes would not be ensured.1 
Investors in long-term capital-intensive projects 
require predictable revenues for any sort of credit 
rating stability and thus in order to be willing to 
invest for modest returns. Business models based on 
unpredictable future market prices would be high 
risk, and therefore would either involve risk-adjusted 
capital cost or be unable to obtain financing. Adequate 
revenue stabilisation mechanisms (RSMs), no matter if 
public or private, would contribute to low capital costs 
and so to an economically viable and environmentally 
1  A RES supply curve based on SRMC would be too flat to 
deliver the necessary producer surplus (missing money problem).
friendly market design.2
On the other hand, competitive prices in line with 
the market are essential to stimulate investment in 
flexibility, efficiency and system integration, including 
digital platforms and cross-sector interactions. 
However, the out-of-market payments from support 
schemes for RES and backup capacity sources (BCS) 
have already achieved a critical level in most European 
markets. For example, in Germany, the out-of-market 
payments for electricity generation have reached a 
share of almost 65 per cent. In the year 2016, market-
oriented remuneration has decreased to ca. EUR 15 
billion3 and non-market remuneration has increased 
to ca. EUR 30 billion.4
If policymakers really want to reverse the trend, it is 
crucial to define and analyse the design errors in the 
existing mechanisms and to take a targeted approach 
to the issue. Should Europe fail to resolve this issue, 
not only will the large-scale market distortions and 
massive redistribution effects in evidence today persist 
and make further market intervention inevitable, but 
they will also sprawl into other energy sectors such as 
heating, cooling and transportation.
Method
In my study, I investigate: (i) the properties of 
the existing market price-setting mechanism and 
the impact from near-zero SRMCs of RES; (ii) 
the investment conditions, the perception of risk 
and reward and the impact of risk adjustments on 
2  Investment in long-term capital-intensive projects 
is very risk sensitive with capital costs being one of the largest 
contributors to the long-term marginal cost (LRMC). The 
predictability of cash flow determines the risk premium and 
amortisation period. For example, refinancing of a newly built gas-
fired power plant (CCGT) based on scarcity pricing would require 
an average price spike of not less than 420 EUR/MWh at 1,000 full 
load hours (FLHs) per annum or 7,450 EUR/MWh at 50 FLHs p.a. 
This in turn can significantly increase the overall electricity cost 
and endanger the economic viability of the system. In an integrated 
European electricity market with an average peak load of 500 GW, 
the additional cost could rise to almost EUR 125 billion p.a.
3  Approximately 500 TWh times the average market price 
of 30 EUR/MWh.
4  EUR 25 billion for generated electricity under the 
Renewable Energies Law, EUR 1.5 billion in form of capacity 
payments under the Cogeneration Act and ca. EUR 3.5 billion for 
capacity reserves and other cost associated with security of supply.
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capital cost; (iii) the balancing effects of potential 
cross-border and cross-sector interactions; (iv) the 
options of intensifying market-driven stimulation of 
ongoing flexibility and efficiency enhancements; and 
(v) the avoidance of distortion in competition and 
unintended distribution effects. The LRMC is one of 
the primary metrics, and strengthening efficiency and 
the effectiveness of market mechanisms the primary 
objective. 
Results
For less regulated, highly flexible and economically 
viable decarbonized markets, the out-of-market 
payments have to be embedded into the market price-
setting mechanism and the mechanism basis itself 
has to be transformed from one grounded on SRMC 
to one based on LRMC. The key characteristics of an 
efficient and effective redesign are: (i) tailored LRMC 
based capacity auctions for a certain number of FLH 
in predefined time periods and for specific backup 
requirements; (ii) the right and obligation to deliver 
for the contracted capacity in all markets; (iii) an 
index-based remuneration mechanism for BCS; and, 
most importantly, (iv) the reduction of the contracted 
remuneration in the amount of the FLHs fed into the 
grid. 
Framework for investment in 
renewable energy 
Markets today are in principle characterised by RSMs 
for all electricity generated in a specific number of 
years, whereby the publicly guaranteed remuneration 
is paid independently of demand and outside of the 
market price-setting mechanism.5 These out-of-market 
payments have formed the basis for the RES deployment 
in the last two decades. European legislation adopted in 
2009 has accelerated this development. Meanwhile, the 
market share of RES and therewith the level of out-of-
market payments has made further market intervention 
necessary such as capacity remuneration mechanisms 
(CRMs) for BCS, prohibition on decommissioning of 
BCS and a controlling regulatory system of penalties, 
levies and taxes. 
5  The most common are: feed in tariffs, contracts for 
difference and renewable obligation certificates. 
In the context of a sustainable and market-oriented 
design for clean, cheap and reliable energy, the 
following two questions have to be addressed: 
1. How can the RES targets be achieved without 
withdrawing the basis for investment in renewable 
energy? Or in other words, how can the out-of-
market payments of today be embedded in a 
competitive market-price setting mechanism of 
tomorrow?
2. How can RES be integrated in the system and 
market-driven price signals for flexibility features 
be achieved? Or in other words, how can the full 
diversity of system flexibility and cross-sector 
interaction be unlocked without additional 
regulatory intervention in the market?
When answering these questions, it is essential to 
bear in mind that long-term RSMs are the basis for 
ongoing investment. However, it does not mean that 
the guaranteed remuneration has to be provided 
independently of demand and for all electricity 
generated. A more market-oriented approach, for 
example guaranteed remuneration for a certain 
number of FLHs in predefined time periods, would 
also work as basis for RES investment and would, in 
addition, provide a sound basis for a truly integrated 
system. 
Appropriate adjustments of RSMs are shown in 
Figure 1 below. The design elements which need to 
be changed are highlighted in red and green. For 
example, in the case of a Power Purchase Agreement 
(PPA), a floor price is guaranteed for a certain number 
of FLH in pre-defined time periods, rather than for all 
electricity generated at any time and independent from 
the demand.6 
In today markets, the RES investors contracted offer 
the electricity generated for the lowest price possible in 
order to secure a power off-take contract and, in turn, 
the remuneration guaranteed.7 The negative impact on 
6  The Netherlands have already adopted a ceiling in the 
RSMs for RES (SDE: Stimulering Duurzame Energieproductie)
7  For example, in Germany the lowest bidding price is 
minus 500 EUR/MWh. When negative market prices occur, the 
contracted supplier pays the negative price to the power off-taker, 
receiving in return the difference with the guaranteed auction 
price. In a future with more and more time periods with a surplus 
of RES supply, market based clearing will become critical.
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the electricity market prices as well as the increase in 
the out-of-market payments needs to be stopped and 
mitigated. In the proposed redesign, the guaranteed 
remuneration will be reduced by the amount of the 
FLHs fed into the grid. Given the fact that investors 
who have been awarded a RSM contract have the right 
and the obligation to deliver for the contracted capacity 
in predefined time periods, the bid price will be equal 
to or higher than the contracted auction price.8 As a 
result, the out-of-market payments for RES will be 
embedded in the market price setting mechanism 
and public funding from support schemes for RES 
will most likely be reduced to zero.9 Investors will be 
compensated from public funds only in cases where 
the FLHs bid are higher and the FLHs generated are 
lower than the FLHs contracted.
There are many reasons why it is becoming increasing 
important to integrate the growing share of fluctuating 
RES into the system. A market-driven price signals 
approach is shown in Figure 2 above. The idea of 
drawing up this approach is the fact that private 
investors are mostly profit oriented and strive to make 
their investments and operations more efficient and 
cost-competitive. In two or more simultaneous tailored 
auctions with different pre-defined time periods10 and 
corresponding auction prices, the investors will be 
incentivized and rewarded for investments in flexibility 
features. The price differences between the auctions 
will provide strong market-driven price signals for 
system flexibility and cross-sector interaction. For 
example, if the cost of flexibility borne by the investor 
is lower or the expected revenue from cross-sector 
interactions is higher than a previous price difference 
of 50 EUR/MWh between auction 1 and auction 2, 
8  For example, the auction price for a wind farm with 
installed capacity of 100 MW is 40 EUR/MWh for 3.000 FLH p.a. 
The guaranteed remuneration would be EUR 12 million p.a. In the 
event that the electricity generated by the wind farm is exactly 300 
GWh p.a., offered for a lower price and contracted for 30 EUR/
MWh in average, the remuneration would be EUR 9 million p.a. 
only. In order to secure the EUR 12 million p.a., the RES investor 
will offer the electricity generated for an average price equal to or 
higher than 40 EUR/MWh only.
9  The generated FLHs should be in principle higher than 
the contracted FLHs. 
10  Based on the demand in specific time periods, e.g. per 
year at any time, per month and per week for a particular mix of on 
and off-peak periods or for low and high seasons. 
the investor will most likely opt for participation in 
auction 2. Conversely, this means that investors with 
higher opportunity cost or lower profit opportunities 
in cross-sector markets may stay with auction 1 and be 
exposed to increasing price pressure and lower profit 
margins. 
The proposed mechanism would primarily provide 
market-driven price signals for innovations and new 
business concepts in short-term flexibility features 
such as demand response, storage systems and platform 
solutions as well as cross-sector revenues from electricity 
heating and cooling, e-mobility and a conversion into 
other forms of energy. The price difference would 
reflect the real cost of system flexibility and stimulate a 
technology-neutral and market-oriented competition. 
The regulator acquires an efficient management tool to 
optimize the electricity supply from RES in line with 
market developments, and thus can allocate resources 
in an economically viable and highly efficient manner. 
An uncontrolled sharp rise in downtime costs in 
critical time periods with a surplus of supply can be 
better monitored, stopped or minimized.
Framework for investment in 
backup capacity 
Across Europe, electricity markets are in principle 
designed as energy only markets (EOM). However, 
a massive increase in out-of-market payments for 
RES has had a profound and destructive impact on 
the economics of conventional power plants, which 
still form the bulk of indispensable BCS. The sum of 
(i) distorted low market prices, (ii) a continuously 
shrinking residual load and (iii) an increase in 
operating and maintenance costs will most likely keep 
the amount of missing money at an unacceptably 
high level. Without CRMs, which have now been 
implemented in most of the larger European electricity 
markets, security of supply would already be at risk.11
Aside from the fact that implementing different forms 
11  For example: price-based CRMs in Germany since 2002 
(other large markets are Spain and Italy), capacity-based CRMs in 
UK since 2014 (capacity auction) and in France since 2016 (capacity 
obligation). Strategic reserves exist in at least eight markets (inter 
alia in Germany, UK, Italy and Poland). In Germany, the price-
based CRM for cogeneration power plants alone has increased 
three-fold to EUR 1.5 billion in 2016.
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of CRMs runs the risk of fragmenting the European 
internal market for electricity, existing CRMs all have 
the same serious design error: they are independent 
of market developments and do not incorporate 
operational efficiency and flexibility. However, in a 
decarbonised, RES dominated future, it will become 
even more important to unlock the full diversity of 
flexibility in BCS and to value the flexibility features 
in line with market trends. The main questions to be 
addressed are as follows: 
1. How can the design errors in existing CRMs be 
fixed and market-driven price signals for flexibility 
and cross-sector interaction achieved? Or in other 
words, how can transparent, innovative and highly 
competitive markets be set up? 
2. In interconnected markets with different 
regulatory frameworks, how can undesirable 
distortion of competition and distribution effects 
be mitigated or even avoided? Or in other words, 
how can maximum long-term compatibility be 
achieved amongst European markets and in cross-
sector interactions? 
3. How can the out-of-market payments of today be 
embedded in a competitive market-price setting 
mechanism of tomorrow? 
Given the key drivers in the energy sector of the future 
(decarbonisation, decentralisation and digitalisation) 
and the increasing complexity of markets, a market-
oriented solution seems to be impossible at first glance. 
However, with a closer look at market mechanisms and 
more thorough analysis of the underlying changes, it is 
possible for a sustainable solution to emerge.
First and foremost, capacity payments must be linked 
to market developments and embedded in the market 
price-setting mechanism. For a competitive and 
market-consistent mechanism, auctions should be 
tailored in line with the characteristics of the diverse 
BCS and capacity remuneration should be index-based 
and be reduced by self-dispatched capacity. 
Figure 3 below shows appropriate adjustments of a 
capacity-based CRM such as in the United Kingdom. 
The design elements which need to be changed are 
highlighted in red and green. For example, in the PPA 
a floor price is guaranteed for a certain number of FLH 
rather than for installed firm capacity. This adjustment 
in conjunction with an index-based SRMC reference 
is of utmost importance. Strong investment incentives 
in operational efficiency and flexibility are given when 
the guaranteed remuneration is based on a capacity 
payment per megawatt hour (EUR/MWh).12 
It will be possible to mitigate negative distribution 
effects and undesired distortion of competition 
through the same redesign of revenue recognition as 
described in the framework for investment in RES 
above. The reduction of contracted capacity payments 
by the amount of the FLHs fed into the grid, provides a 
strong incentive to participate in the electricity markets 
for a price equal to or higher than the investors own 
SRMC plus the auction price. The negative impact 
of windfall profits may be avoided and the highest 
possible level of long-term compatibility amongst 
European markets and in cross-sector interactions will 
have been achieved. 
The introduction of an index-based SRMC reference 
overcomes the parallel world of EOM and CRM and 
thus the independency of capacity payments from 
market developments which has been the subject of 
criticism. The most suitable index is most likely the well-
known clean spark spread (CSS). The CSS represents 
the profit contribution on electricity generated and is 
calculated as following:
The reference price indices must be transparent to 
all market participants. The most suitable publicly 
available price indices for the European electricity 
markets seem to be Phelix for electricity, NCG for gas 
and EU-ETS for CO2-certificates. Reference efficiency 
in the nominal output point should be given for 
the gross calorific value and be close to 55 per cent. 
Reference efficiency rather than minimum efficiency 
12  The unintended outcome in the first capacity auctions 
in the UK is caused by this reason. The auction is designed for 
cheap installed capacity. As a result, successful new capacity was 
primarily from relatively inefficient and cheap small-scale engines. 
Almost no new capacity from highly efficient large-scale gas fired 
power plants could secure a contract. 
CSS (market) = reference price for electricity 
– (reference price for gas + reference price for 
CO2-certificate)ƞ
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enables auctions to run on a technology-open basis 
and avoids discriminatory treatments.13 
Reference efficiency in conjunction with reference price 
indices for electricity, fuel cost and carbon allowances 
would have a positive side effect: it would ensure 
the price for ancillary services called by the system 
operator were calculated in a simple and transparent 
manner, and facilitate low administration burden and 
costs. The complicated and lengthy calculations typical 
at present would be avoided. 
As shown in figure 4 above, two or more simultaneous 
tailored auctions are envisaged to address specific 
needs, to unlock the full diversity of flexibility features 
and to avoid discriminatory treatment.14 Given the fact 
that self-dispatched capacity will reduce remuneration 
under secured contracts and cross-sector revenues 
will not, profit-oriented investors will have a strong 
incentive to reduce the more inefficient start-up, 
shutdown and part-load time periods and to optimize 
the load sequence operation in line with cross-sector 
interactions. Both incentives would most likely 
contribute significantly to a reduction of unintended 
must-run capacities and thus to overall system 
flexibility. In addition, there is a strong incentive for 
the investors to optimize their own fuel costs.15
The bidding process should preferably be arranged in 
two phases. In the first phase, bids have to include firm 
capacity plus a price in EUR/MWh for a given number 
of FLH p.a.16 Based on the outcome in each of the 
tailored auctions, the regulator can optimize the BCS 
portfolio by pre-qualifying the bidders for the second 
phase in line with security of supply requirements and 
the most efficient allocation of resources. Price caps 
and tendered capacities in the second and final phase 
are determined by the aggregate bid curves in the first 
13  Minimum efficiency as a pre-qualification criterion was 
inter alia criticized in the Belgian capacity auction mechanism. 
14  Everybody can take part and multiple bids are allowed.
15  For example: they can increase profit through fuel mix 
optimization, structuring costs and use of hedging instruments; it 
would be possible to reduce fuel costs significantly by entering into 
bilateral agreements.
16  Process as applied in the PJM-RPM, multiple bids 
allowed.
bidding phase.17 
The bidding prices would be based on self-determined 
LRMC in EUR/MWh and primarily be a function of 
the following key-metrics:
Contracted investors’ revenue will be the sum of self-
dispatched electricity generated, ancillary services 
called by the system operator, capacity payments for 
unused contracted capacity and cross-sector revenues. 
Revenue from ancillary services is calculated as 
following: 
The revenue from unused contracted capacity is 
calculated as following:
For a better understanding of the index-based 
remuneration mechanism, a sample calculation for 
a contracted investor is shown in figure 5 below. The 
contracted bidding price reflects the self-determined 
annual fixed cost of electricity divided by the number 
17  This will prevent distortion due to administratively 
fixed price caps and demand curves. A highly competitive and 
transparent tendering process will be achieved.
CSS (auction) = f (capex, financing structure, 
perception of risk and reward, capital cost, 
provision cost, contracted term, contracted 
performance hours, reference efficiency and 
reference price of fuel cost, own efficiency and 
flexibility, own fuel cost, cross-sector revenues 
and market outlook) 
Revenue (ancillary services) = contracted firm 
capacity x called FLH x (CSS (auction) – CSS 
(market)ƞ) 
with: CSS (auction) < CSS (market)ƞ:  
Revenue = market price 
          CSS (auction) > CSS (market) ƞ:  
Revenue = market price + (CSS(auction) – 
CSS(market)ƞ) 
Revenue (unused capacity) = contracted firm 
capacity x unused FLH x CSS (auction) 
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Figure 1: RSM for RES – status quo versus redesign proposal 
of contracted performance hours. In the example 
given, an investor would have a strong incentive to 
participate in electricity markets for a price equal to or 
higher than his own SRMC plus 50 EUR/MWh, which 
together make up his LRMC. 
Conclusions
The proposed redesign can easily be adopted by 
existing RSMs for RES and BCS. At the beginning of 
the development process, certain parts of the BCS may 
work as strategic reserves during critical time periods. 
As development is being completed, the overall 
market price-setting mechanism will be grounded on 
a competitive LRMC-based rather than a distorted 
SRMC-based merit order. A predictable revenue as 
required for investment in long-term capital-intensive 
projects on modest return expectation and a delivery 
of efficient and effective outcomes will have been 
ensured. The re-regulation trend will be reversed 
and the allocated resources from the public purse for 
investment in renewable energy will be reduced to 
zero. A sustainable and highly competitive design for 
clean energy and flexibility to meet changing system 
requirements will finally be achieved. 
45
Figure 3: RSM for BCS - status quo versus redesign proposal
Figure 2: RES system integration by market-driven price signals 
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Figure 4: Pre-qualification criteria and targeted BCS flexibility 
Figure 5: Sample calculation for an index-based remuneration mechanism
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SECURITY OF 
SUPPLY – A 
CONSUMER’S 
CHOICE 
Peter Fraser
Highlights
The four papers we discussed during the parallel 
session advocated two complementary strategies. Two 
of the papers rely on the demand side, i.e. consumer 
participation, to ensure security of supply, while 
the second pair aim to address the supply side to 
guarantee that both intermittent and flexible resources 
are adequately compensated. Of the first two papers, 
the most straightforward approach was advocated 
by Doorman and de Vries. They proposed that each 
consumer nominate their preferred level of guaranteed 
peak capacity (subject to a minimum default level), 
while the utility provides load limiters to prevent the 
customer from exceeding that capacity during a peak 
event. Physically restricting demand of individual 
customers decreases the risk of inadequate supply 
and reflects the individual consumer preference. 
Winzer and Borggrefe advocated a similar but more 
sophisticated approach, where each customer would 
ultimately be expressing his own ‘demand curve’ and 
would be required to limit consumption to different 
levels subject to different prices. One important 
contrast between the two approaches is that the one 
proposed by Doorman relies on a capacity allocation 
based on annual peak demand and a TSO decision 
when the event is triggered. On the contrary, Winzer 
and Borggrefe (and the other two papers discussed 
below) rely on scarcity pricing to ‘scare people’ and get 
them to change their behaviour. Technology is going 
to make this task easier for consumers to implement.
The other two papers aim to change how generators are 
compensated to ensure that both intermittent resources 
and flexible resources can be adequately compensated 
through two separate markets. Keay and Robinson 
propose that variable renewables would essentially 
offer power into a ‘when available’ market and be paid 
based on a regulated price. Customers would buy the 
additional power they may need from an ‘on demand’ 
market which would have power sold by flexible 
resources. The key element of the proposal is to avoid 
price contamination of the flexible resource market by 
the inflexible resource market. Higher prices for the 
former would encourage investment and send price 
signals to end users to curb consumption during peaks. 
The Climate Policy Initiative proposal presented by 
Felicity Carus was, on the contrary, focussed primarily 
on how to procure renewable kWh at the lowest cost 
(i.e., to avoid exposing generation from renewables 
to the market conditions since this fact would put 
them at risk of being curtailed and increase their cost 
of capital), while having all other flexible generation 
units exposed to a PJM style market (nodal pricing 
and ancillary service market but no capacity market). 
Both proposals rely on scarcity pricing to encourage 
consumers to cut demand.
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AN ELECTRICITY 
MARKET DESIGN 
BASED ON CONSUMER 
DEMAND FOR 
CAPACITY
Gerard Doorman and Laurens de Vries
Introduction
It is generally assumed that solar and wind energy 
(vRES) will play a large role in a low-carbon power 
system, but with them security of supply remains a 
major challenge. Short periods of supply shortage can 
be met with storage or by shifting demand, but the key 
challenge for a low-carbon electricity system is how to 
provide sufficient electricity during periods when wind 
and solar generation are incapable to meet demand. 
Market parties may provide part of the required 
flexibility, in the form of demand response, storage and 
flexible generation options such as biomass. However, 
there will be from time to time larger shortages, like for 
instance periods in winter of more than a week without 
wind, limited solar generation and high heat demand. 
The risk of investing in facilities that are used once 
per year or less is too high for market parties, if they 
need to recover their investment only from the (very) 
high energy prices that occur when their generation is 
needed. 
In addition, it will also be difficult for vRES to recover 
their costs, as they tend to produce when prices are 
low, but not when they are high (Aghaie, 2017; Hirth, 
2014). They, too, face high investment risk, as they are 
capital-intensive and their revenues are highly sensitive 
to weather and to changes in demand and supply (such 
as higher than expected investment in generation).
Therefore, we argue that an Energy-Only market will 
not provide incentives to invest in either vRES or 
necessary flexible capacity. The market design must 
therefore hedge risks for variable and controllable 
generation (including storage), for generators and 
consumers alike. 
Therefore, we propose a system that is based on two 
pillars:
• Capacity Subscriptions to ensure that demand can 
be limited to available generation when necessary 
(Section 2);
• Tenders for variable renewable energy in combi-
nation with a level playing field for decentralised 
generation (Section 3).
 
Capacity Subscription has a number of advantages:
• Consumers pay directly for the scarce resource, 
i.e. generation capacity;
• System adequacy moves in the direction of a 
private good;
• Consumers do not face extreme price spikes in 
the energy market;
• Demand flexibility is internalized in the consum-
ers’ decisions;
• Demand is controlled by the consumer in real 
time and physical shortages are avoided;
• Producers are remunerated by selling capacity 
and not dependent on rare scarcity prices;
• The price and quantity of capacity are both mar-
ket based.
 
As indicated above, we do not believe that vRES 
will be able to recover their costs in the energy-only 
market. We therefore propose tenders for vRES, which 
recently have been quite successful for several places 
in Northern Europe. Should vRES become able to 
recover their costs only from energy sales in the long 
run, tender bid prices will drop to zero and the tenders 
will phase themselves out. 
The essentials of capacity 
subscription
With Capacity Subscription (Doorman, 2005: Doorman 
and Botterud, 2008; Margellos and Oren, 2016) 
consumers buy the amount of generation capacity 
they are going to need during system scarcity periods. 
They buy capacity subscriptions from providers of firm 
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capacity (generation and storage). When a consumer 
buys a capacity subscription of, say, 4 kW, he is 
guaranteed that he can consume electricity up to this 
capacity level under all conditions. When the energy 
market is short of generation capacity, e.g. during a 
period without much solar and wind energy, the TSO 
activates so-called Load Limiting Devices (LLDs) that 
are installed at each consumer site. Thus, consumers 
must restrict their consumption to the levels that they 
contracted. In return they have the certainty that this 
capacity is available. When there is no shortage of 
generation capacity – most of the time – consumption 
is unrestricted.
Risk reduction for consumers and 
generation 
Because physical shortages are avoided, scarcity 
prices do not occur. A capacity subscription may 
therefore be considered as a sort of physical option 
contract: by paying for the capacity subscription, a 
consumer obtains the right to consume electricity at a 
contracted price at any time, avoiding scarcity prices. 
For generation companies, the benefits are that the 
demand for reliable capacity is made explicit and that 
the payments are spread out over time. In fact, this 
system turns reliable capacity into a product with a 
steady remuneration.
Consumers
Crucial questions for consumers include how much 
capacity they need, when they need it, how it coincides 
with system scarcity and if they have alternative means 
to reduce their need for capacity.
Based on available data and forecasts, apps and web 
sites can be developed to support consumers to make 
choices that match their preferences. Moreover, in a 
system with widespread use of Capacity Subscription, 
there will be a strong demand for such solutions, 
typically incentivizing their development.
Demand flexibility
A compelling feature of Capacity Subscription is 
that it creates incentives to keep demand below the 
subscribed capacity and to develop the technology for 
this purpose. If Capacity Subscription is widely used, 
millions of consumers will be interested to control 
their demand, creating opportunities for companies to 
develop and sell solutions.
Capacity subscription turns 
reliability into a private good
Ensuring system adequacy by having sufficient 
generation capacity is the way consumers’ preferences 
for uninterrupted supply normally are satisfied. 
Obviously, in this setting system adequacy has 
strong common good characteristics. With Capacity 
Subscription, consumers weigh the cost of capacity 
against their preferences for unlimited supply. If the 
price of capacity is high, industrial consumers will 
over time redesign their production processes to be 
able to reduce their need for capacity. Households and 
services will similarly have incentives to look at ways to 
reduce demand when necessary. Capacity Subscription 
thus has the unique feature that it reveals the need for 
capacity in the market, based on consumers’ preferences 
for uninterrupted supply, which internalizes system 
adequacy in the market: the generation part of system 
adequacy becomes a private good.
Capacity supply
The main capacity suppliers are the generators. They 
can sell the capacity they expect to have available 
during periods of system scarcity. When a scarcity 
event occurs, generators need to demonstrate their 
availability by bidding in the relevant markets, day-
ahead, intraday and balancing. There needs to be 
a significant penalty for non-compliance to avoid 
gaming. 
Activation of the LLDs and the 
role of the TSO
The main role of Capacity Subscription is to ensure the 
balance between demand and supply at system level. 
In this context, the TSO is the obvious entity in charge 
of activating the LLDs. While actual activation will 
only happen close to real-time, the TSO issues advance 
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warnings before the day-ahead market clearing and 
subsequently throughout the day until (close to) real-
time. Consumers need to be “notified” in advance in 
order to be prepared. 
Capacity auctions
Annual auctions are the primary market place. 
The auctions need to be held well in advance of the 
season when residual demand (demand minus vRES 
production) peaks. There is no lead time, i.e. only 
existing capacity can participate. However, owners of 
new plants know that, once a plant is commissioned, it 
will receive revenues from selling capacity. Additional 
auctions will be needed to address changes in supply 
and demand of capacity, but this may also be solved 
through continuous trade. Participation in auctions or 
continuous trade in capacity is not relevant for small 
consumers – instead they could buy capacity from 
a retailer, much in the same way as they buy energy 
today. Retailers will then buy capacity on behalf of 
small consumers.
Simplified solution for small 
consumers
Household consumers can be provided with a default 
capacity subscription that is based on their peak 
capacity usage recorded during the previous year, 
without the physical limitation. There would be no 
immediate penalty for exceeding the capacity level, but 
in this case, the next years’ capacity subscription would 
be based on their new consumption peak. This way, 
consumers do not need to think about buying capacity 
subscription while they still have a strong incentive for 
reducing their contribution to the system consumption 
peak. Consumers who want to reduce their cost can 
opt into the system by buying a capacity subscription 
and committing to that level of peak consumption.
Variable renewable energy
We distinguish between three different categories of 
renewable energy technologies: large-scale variable 
renewable energy, behind-the-meter variable renewable 
energy, and controllable renewable energy. Large-scale 
variable renewable energy, such as wind parks and 
large solar plants, should be subject to competition 
in order to bring their costs down. The same is true 
of small-scale variable renewable energy generators, 
but a market with a large number of small generators, 
often owned by households, needs to be organized 
differently. Controllable RES can sell capacity under 
the Capacity Subscription scheme in competition with 
other providers of reliable capacity. 
Tenders for large-scale vRES
Auctions (tenders) for renewable energy balance 
effectiveness with cost-efficiency. In such tenders 
renewable energy projects are able to obtain subsidies 
equal to the difference between their average cost and 
the market price (Del Río and Linares, 2014). The 
subsidies are awarded to the projects that demand 
the least subsidy per unit of electricity. Investor risk 
related to auction process can be reduced, e.g. if the 
government selects the site and publishes information 
about wind speed, sea bottom conditions etc. In 
addition, successful bids may receive the necessary 
permits and a grid connection. Should the renewable 
energy generators begin to earn back their investments 
in the market, the prices set by the tenders are will go 
to zero and the auctions will phase themselves out.
Financing the tenders
We propose to pass the costs of the tenders as a per-
kWh charge to consumers. Wholesale prices will 
continue to be determined by the marginal cost of 
generation, which is important for economic efficiency. 
Although it may drop to zero in case of excess supply 
of variable renewable energy sources, the wholesale 
price of electricity ensures that incentives to curtail 
excessive vRES production and to invest in storage 
facilities remain in place. At the same time, a levy on 
final energy consumption for recovering the cost of 
the tenders has the interesting property of providing 
a balanced incentive for self-generation, as we will 
discuss below.
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Small-scale variable renewable 
energy
Small-scale (behind-the-meter) renewable energy 
generation is usually remunerated in a way that is 
clearly not sustainable in the long term, namely through 
annual net metering. There are several problematic 
aspects with this:
• It ignores the time value of electricity, i.e. the 
prosumer implicitly pays/receives the same price 
regardless of system conditions;
• Households avoid taxes and levies and in many 
cases also network charges. This is an implicit 
subsidy that may be unreasonably high and may 
lead to grid defection;
• Equity. This approach is in reality a subsidy to 
those who can invest in small-scale vRES from 
those that cannot, e.g. because they have no avail-
able area for PV or lack financial resources.
 
Distributed generation should be 
exposed to real-time prices
Consumers who generate some of their own electricity 
(so called prosumers) should buy and sell at the 
prevailing real-time wholesale price. This will also 
provide better incentives for demand response and 
storage and for curtailing vRES generation when there 
is excess supply.
Most surcharges on electricity 
are undesirable in a low-carbon 
system
Most of the taxes, levies and energy charges (the 
second bullet point mentioned above) can and should 
be removed in a sustainable energy system. Grid 
charges should be (peak) capacity-based and not 
energy related, as the network costs largely consist of 
capital costs. When electricity is generated (mostly) 
sustainably, it is no longer necessary to charge a ‘sin 
tax’ on electricity. 
Remaining charges stimulate 
distributed generation
The remaining charges are the renewable energy levy, 
i.e. the financial source for the tenders for large-scale 
vRES, and the VAT. When consumers generate their 
own electricity at the moment that they consume 
it, they avoid these charges. Avoidance of the VAT 
creates a small economic distortion to the advantage 
of distributed generation. Avoidance of the renewable 
energy levy, on the other hand, provides a benefit for 
self-generated renewable energy that is equal (per kWh) 
to the tender payments for large-scale vRES, resulting 
in a level playing field for large-scale and behind-the-
meter vRES, without the need for additional policy 
instruments. 
Hourly settlement of prosumers 
reduces equity problems
Settlement at the real-time wholesale price also reduces 
the equity problem. One problem with annual net 
metering is that all local production is subtracted from 
demand. Net demand may become quite small and as a 
result prosumers may end up not contributing to large 
scale vRES, even though they significantly profit from 
it (i.e. in those hours when their own production is 
lower than their demand). Hourly netting significantly 
reduces this problem, as prosumers will then pay the 
full price for all energy they use from the grid. 
Conclusions
Economic efficiency, risk 
reduction and security
We propose a combination of Capacity Subscription, 
tenders for large-scale variable energy and a 
remuneration system for vRES that creates a level 
playing field for generation behind the meter. A 
unique feature of Capacity Subscription is that demand 
for capacity is based on the individual consumers’ 
preferences for uninterrupted supply. Based on this 
demand, providers are ensured a market-based revenue 
for their capacity and consumers are certain that they 
have access to the electricity they need at affordable 
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prices. This market design combines economic 
efficiency with a significant reduction of risk for both 
consumers and generation companies and guarantees 
security of supply.
Consumer payments
In our market design consumers make the following 
payments:
• A monthly payment for their capacity subscrip-
tion; 
• A payment per unit of electricity that they con-
sume that is equal to the real-time wholesale price 
of electricity plus a surcharge for large-scale vari-
able renewable energy and VAT;
• A grid fee, which we recommend is mainly based 
on capacity. The subscribed capacity is a natural 
basis for the grid fee. 
 
The capacity subscriptions pay for the controllable 
generation capacity that will serve load when there is 
not enough vRES. Real-time electricity prices cover 
the variable cost of generation. The renewable energy 
levy pays for the tenders for large-scale vRES. Small-
scale vRES units earn their cost from the avoided cost 
of buying electricity from the market (with renewable 
energy levy added to the market price). Grid tariffs 
are mainly based on capacity (a combination with the 
subscribed capacity should be considered).
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POWER TO THE 
PEOPLE – CREATING 
MARKETS FOR 
SUPPLY SECURITY 
BASED ON CONSUMER 
CHOICE
Christian Winzer and Frieder Borggrefe
Introduction
As a result of increasing renewables penetration in the 
European electricity mix, the average utilization rate 
of dispatchable plants will continue to decline. At the 
same time, during a few hours per year, or longer time 
periods every couple of years, intermittent renewables 
may produce very little, while demand may be high. 
In order to provide a similar level of supply security 
as today, there will be a need for significant amounts 
of back-up capacity. Thus, the total cost of the energy 
system will increasingly depend on the amount and 
the firmness of capacity that is required by consumers, 
rather than the amount of energy they consume.
However, current supply contracts and grid usage tariffs 
often do not charge end-consumers for the amount of 
capacity they require. This is particularly problematic 
in light of an increasing number of customers with 
electric vehicles, using their grid connection capacity 
to the technical limits.
Besides, the required firmness of non-interruptible 
contracts is usually derived from value of lost load 
(VOLL) estimates, rather than from contractually 
agreed compensations for emergency curtailments. 
However, curtailment cost estimates based on stated 
preferences are a very imprecise indicator of the true 
curtailment cost. Since, the curtailment of consumers 
from the grid will not always lead to a black-out, as 
consumers may have decentralised back-up supplies, 
curtailment costs will vary strongly, both between 
consumer groups (e.g. between consumers with 
and without back-up supply) and across time (e.g. 
depending on the purpose for which the electricity is 
used or the charging level of home batteries). 
As a result of the uncertainty about true curtailment 
costs, existing administrative approaches to supply 
security will be very inefficient. At the same time, 
falling cost of information technology will enable 
smarter demand side management approaches and 
tariff schemes, such as the ones suggested in this 
contribution, to thrive. 
Shortcomings of the Winter 
Package
The Winter Package presented by the European 
Commission in late 2016 claims to offer a “new deal for 
consumers”. However, it continues to foresee a largely 
administrative approach to supply security. According 
to it, both the price caps in wholesale markets and the 
procurement targets of capacity mechanisms should 
be based on regulatory estimates of a constant, single 
value of lost load (EC, 2017a, Article 10 and 19), 
rather than on contracted curtailment costs. During 
simultaneous scarcity situations, the dispatch should 
follow administrative regional load shedding plans 
(EC, 2017b, Article 12) and investment incentives 
in transmission and distribution grid infrastructure 
may continue to be based on administrative reliability 
targets. 
As a result, market arrangements will lead to an 
inefficient dispatch during scarcities as well as distorted 
investment incentives, falling short of the promise 
to place the consumer at the centre of the decision 
process. Concerns about market power and excessive 
risks, will exert pressure on politicians to keep price 
caps low. At the same time, the fear of occasional 
outages will prompt them to overinvest in capacity 
and overestimate reliability targets for grid operators 
(Newbery, 2016). 
Overview of suggested 
arrangements
In line with the requirements in (EC, 2017a, Article 12) 
and (EC, 2017b, Article 15), we propose to tackle the 
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problem at its root by asking each consumer to select 
and pay for his individually preferred reliability level, as 
well as compensating consumers for grid curtailments. 
This could be achieved through the following steps:
• A. Ask all consumers to specify their curtailment 
price curve;
• B. Allocate curtailment risks and compensations 
accordingly;
• C. Allocate cost of all back-up capacity accordingly.
As illustrated in figure 1, consumers who specify 
a high curtailment price, would receive a higher 
compensation during the hours when they need to be 
curtailed. As system operators aim to minimize the cost 
of curtailments, consumers with a high curtailment 
price would thus be curtailed less often, and benefit 
from a lower curtailment risk. In return, they would be 
asked to pay a higher share of the cost for the back-up 
grid, generation and storage capacity. This would allow 
each consumer to trade-off the benefits of a higher 
reliability level against the associated cost and select 
the reliability level which best suits his individual 
needs at different points in time. Today’s administrative 
approach to supply security would thus be replaced 
with an approach based on consumer choice. 
In section 4, we provide further design details for each 
of the above mentioned steps. Section 5 describes how 
a smooth transition could be achieved from today’s 
situation characterised by an incomplete smart-
meter roll-out and centralized capacity mechanisms. 
In section 6 we summarize the expected impacts 
and questions for future research. Further details on 
several of these topics can be found in our forthcoming 
research paper.1
Design details
Ask all consumers to specify their curtailment price 
curve
Each consumer could select his desired level of supply 
security by specifying the required amount and 
firmness of capacity that he requires. As displayed in 
Figure 2, depending on his needs, a consumer could 
for example:
• A.Specify a single curtailment price, which is valid 
for his total grid connection capacity;
• B. Specify a very high curtailment price for the 
required amount of “firm” capacity and a lower 
curtailment price for the rest of his grid connection 
capacity;
• C. Distinguish several tranches of consumption 
with decreasing curtailment prices.
Consumers who want could further differentiate their 
curtailment price based on the time of the day, week 
or year, the advanced notice that is given to them, etc.
As a starting point, regulators will need to define a 
1  Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2956590.
Figure 1: Overview of suggested market arrangements
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default tariff for consumers. This could be a tariff such 
as (B), where the amount of firm capacity corresponds 
to a consumer’s share of the capacity mechanism 
procurement target (as suggested by Doorman, 2005), 
and the curtailment price for the remaining non-firm 
capacity corresponds to today’s spot market price cap. 
Consumers could then be given the choice to select a 
different tariff, or remain in the default tariff, if they do 
not wish to actively engage in the market.
In order to allow for a transparent comparison 
between different suppliers, it could further be helpful 
if regulators pre-specify a limited number of “standard 
tariff options” that have to be offered by each supplier. 
To anticipate the cost and risk of different curtailment 
prices, consumers should finally be provided with 
additional information, such as the curtailment 
frequency and duration, monthly electricity cost, 
maximum hourly bill, etc. that would have resulted 
from different curtailment prices applied to their 
historical demand profile (if available) or an average 
load profile. 
Allocate curtailment risks and 
compensations
Curtailment price curves should be offered in the 
balancing energy market. Whenever load shedding is 
required as a last resort measure to balance demand 
and supply, the imbalance price should thus rise to the 
marginal curtailment price.2  Load-limiting devices 
2  Subject to an implementation of Article 30 literal 1.a 
of the Electricity Balancing Guideline, which foresees marginal 
balancing energy prices. 
or smart meters should restrict the consumption of 
each household to the amount of capacity for which a 
curtailment price above the current balancing energy 
price have been specified. This would ensure that 
scarcity prices reflect the true value of energy. At the 
same time, the “firmer” consumption tranches with a 
higher curtailment price would be protected against 
rotating outages.
During curtailments, the compensation for the 
explicit demand response which consumers provide 
through their curtailment price curve should be 
fairly distributed between suppliers and consumers 
(or aggregators). Consumers (or the aggregators, to 
whom consumers sell their demand response) should 
receive the difference between the market price and 
their supply price, while suppliers should continue 
to receive the same supply price and retain the same 
balancing responsibility as if their consumers were not 
curtailed.3  Figure 3 illustrates the resulting distribution 
of revenues for the stylized cases of A) a consumer 
with a fixed supply price, and B) a consumer who is 
supplied at the real-time, imbalance price. In both 
cases, consumers will be curtailed when the market 
price rises above their curtailment price. 
In case of a fixed price contract (A), suppliers will 
typically continue to deliver the energy which they have 
purchased for their consumers in forward markets. 
Consumers would thus purchase the energy from their 
supplier at the fixed supply price (dark blue area) and 
resell it at the imbalance price. The net compensation 
of the consumers would thus be equal to the difference 
3  Following the concept of ‘unbundled transactions’ 
suggested by (Hogan, 2009)
Figure 2: Curtailment price curves
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between market prices and their fixed supply price 
(dark green area). 
In case of a contract indexed to the imbalance price (B), 
suppliers may or may not purchase the energy for their 
consumers in advance. In any case, consumers would 
not receive any compensation for their curtailment as 
the market price equals the supply price which they 
have contracted. Suppliers would continue to receive 
the supply price which they agreed with consumers 
(dark blue area). But they would also be responsible to 
balance the amount of energy which their consumers 
would have consumed if they had not been curtailed. 
If they have not purchased this energy in advance, 
their net compensation would thus also be zero, as the 
dark blue area would be cancelled out by imbalance 
payments.
Curtailment cost of most consumers will vary strongly 
across time. Consumers should thus be free to adjust 
curtailment prices at any time by:
• Offering implicit demand response and restricting 
or shifting their consumption at prices below their 
curtailment price curve;
• Updating their curtailment price curve, which will 
be used to trigger their explicit demand response as 
well as to allocate costs of back-up capacity. 
As the penetration of smart devices increases, these 
adjustments could even be automated, so as to further 
reduce the transaction costs for consumers. In order 
to avoid opportunistic behaviour, the conditions and 
prices of these switching decisions need to be designed 
appropriately. For example, the cost for setting a 
higher curtailment price could be indexed to the cost 
of buying or selling equivalent yearly option contracts. 
Allocate cost of back-up capacity
Avoiding curtailments comes at a cost. As mentioned 
in (Winzer, 2012) the continuity of supplies can be 
influenced by a number of different risks. Some of 
these risks are displayed along the horizontal axis in 
Figure 4. Each actor – including consumers – can take 
actions which directly mitigate risks by reducing their 
likelihood of occurrence (see the dark blue boxes in 
Figure 4). In addition to that, some of the actions may 
indirectly mitigate other risks along the supply chain 
by reducing their impact. For example, if consumers 
or their suppliers reduce the cost of grid curtailments, 
through a behaviour change or back-up technologies 
such as home batteries or PV panels, this would 
indirectly mitigate any of the other risk sources listed 
further to the left in the graph. Generally speaking, 
the closer to the consumer mitigation measures are 
located, the more risks can be mitigated through them.
Figure 3: Sharing of curtailment compensations
58
The share of costs for the back-up grid and generation 
capacity which is allocated to each consumer (or any 
other actor along the supply chain) should correspond 
to the level of “insurance” each consumer wishes 
to contract from the rest of the system. Consumers 
who chose a very low curtailment price or a low 
volume of capacity should pay a low share of costs, 
while consumers selecting a higher curtailment price 
or a higher volume of capacity should pay a higher 
share of costs for back-up capacity (for example see 
Oren and Doucet, 1990; and Wilson, 1997). The 
selected curtailment price curves would thus act as an 
“interface” which would enable each player along the 
supply chain to trade-off the cost of his own mitigation 
measures against the cost of transferring risks to other 
actors along the supply chain who may be better placed 
to mitigate them.
In order to achieve this, some of the contracts which 
are used to transfer costs and risks across the supply 
chain would need to be adapted. For instance, supply 
contracts between consumers and their suppliers, 
as well as grid usage contracts with DSOs and TSOs 
should compensate grid curtailments at the respective 
curtailment price. In addition to that, grid usage 
tariffs should ensure that the share of the costs which 
is borne by a connected party does not only depend 
on the volume of contracted capacity (or on peak 
demand), but also on the selected curtailment price(s), 
which may be different for consumers with identical 
peak demand. In order to prevent an opportunistic 
switching of curtailment prices, the cost allocation 
should also take into account the point in time and 
duration during which different curtailment prices 
have been selected. 
Transitional Arrangements
Allow consumers to vote on 
average reliability levels
Consumers without smart meters or load-limiting 
devices that allow their individual disconnection from 
Figure 4: Market based approach vs. administrative approach to ensure security of supply
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the grid effectively share the same reliability level 
with all other consumers connected to the same grid 
segment. As a transitional measure, these users could 
be allowed to indicate their preferred reliability level 
as part of their supply contract. However, they would 
receive (and pay for) the weighted average reliability 
level of the distribution grid section, to which they are 
connected.
Consumers who are not satisfied with the average 
curtailment risk of their neighbourhood, could install 
a smart meter or a load limiting device in order to 
select and pay for a lower, individual reliability level, 
or install back-up batteries and supplies in order to 
reduce their cost of grid curtailments or both. The 
resulting demand pull for smart technologies could 
allow for a more efficient roll-out than today’s blanket 
roll-out of smart meters. 
Allow consumers to opt out of 
capacity mechanisms
Countries with a capacity mechanism, could foster 
a transition towards a consumer based valuation of 
supply security, by allowing (groups of) consumers 
who can be individually disconnected, to opt out of 
the capacity mechanism. As a prerequisite to that, 
each consumer would need to bear the share of the 
capacity mechanism cost, which corresponds to the 
capacity that is procured “on his behalf ”. Consumers 
who opt out of the capacity mechanism should then 
be exempted from the capacity payment and not 
considered in future procurement auctions. In return, 
if demand at the maximum curtailment price exceeds 
supply during one of the capacity mechanism delivery 
periods, the consumers who opted out of the capacity 
mechanisms should be curtailed first, before the 
remaining customers are curtailed. 
In order to prevent opportunistic behaviour, the rules 
for switching in and out of the capacity mechanism 
need to be designed appropriately. Most likely, this 
would include secondary trading of the insurance 
provided by capacity mechanisms.
Conclusions and next steps
We expect that an implementation of our propositions 
would solve the missing money problem that has been 
identified already by Stoft in 2002. As displayed in 
Figure 5, the suggested market design would: 
• Improve consumer participation and innovation 
Figure 5: Expected benefits of the suggested arrangements
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incentives, as explicit decisions by consumers 
would increase their awareness about the cost-
benefits of different supply security levels. This 
could lead consumers to explore alternative back-
up technologies, investments into smart meters 
and demand side management measures as 
well as behavioural change, triggering a wave of 
innovation;
• Improve dispatch during emergencies, as consumers 
set the curtailment price for different tranches 
of their consumption. Curtailments within and 
across countries could thus be distributed in a 
way that minimizes curtailment cost, for example 
through partial load shedding, rather than based 
on administrative risk preparedness plans and 
rotating outages;
• Improve hedging and investment incentives, as 
sufficiently high prices in the wholesale and real-
time markets would create a natural demand for 
hedging contracts. This could remove the need 
for administrative reliability targets and capacity 
mechanisms which are prone to over-investment.
In order to provide a safe passage towards the 
suggested market design, further research should 
explore critical issues such as the transaction cost of 
the suggested arrangements, the appropriate design 
of supply contracts, grid usage tariffs and, more 
generally speaking, contracting structures for efficient 
risk transfer, arrangements to prevent opportunistic 
switching as well as redistributional impacts and 
potential compensation schemes. Eventually, the 
design and impacts of consumer interactions should 
be tested through field trials in order to obtain a more 
detailed estimate of the potential cost, benefits and 
crucial design parameters of the proposed market 
design.
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MARKET DESIGN FOR 
A DECARBONISED 
ELECTRICITY 
MARKET: THE ‘TWO-
MARKET’ APPROACH
Malcolm Keay and David Robinson
Introduction
Our starting point is that current energy-only electricity 
markets are broken,1 especially in power systems with 
high penetration of intermittent renewables. Energy-
only markets are designed to discriminate between 
sources with different short-run marginal costs 
(SRMC); by selecting the lowest cost plants they should 
lead to both short and long-run efficiency.2 However, 
this design is based on the assumption of dispatchable 
plants with varying marginal costs, an assumption 
which will no longer hold good in the decarbonised 
market of the future if, as seems inevitable, it will be 
dominated by intermittent plants with low or zero 
SRMC. In such circumstances, energy-only markets 
cannot remunerate investment and may not be 
able to provide effective signals for operation or for 
consumers. Furthermore, there is no exit strategy – as 
long as plants with near-zero SRMC dominate, they 
need support from outside the wholesale market, 
but their presence in the market creates ‘pecuniary 
externalities’ which distort that market and lead to a 
need for support for conventional plants via capacity 
1  See, inter alia, Keay M., J. Rhys, and D. Robinson 
(2014), Electricity Markets and Pricing for the Distributed 
Generation Era, in Distributed Generation and its Implications 
for the Utility Industry”, Sioshansi F. (ed.), Elsevier, and Keay 
M (2016), Electricity markets are broken – can they be 
fixed?, OIES Paper: EL 17, January 2016.
2  Recognising that prices will need to exceed SRMC at 
times to recover fixed costs.
payments and the like.3 In this situation there are no 
market signals to optimise the system – the quantity 
and type of renewable plants are determined by the 
nature of the support schemes, while conventional 
plants are needed essentially as a residual to balance the 
system, in a quantity (and often of a type) determined 
by government decisions. In other words, markets 
are increasingly growing less effective in performing 
their essential functions – remunerating investment, 
providing for efficient operation, giving useful signals 
for consumers, optimising the generation mix – and 
are not sustainable without support. Proposed reforms 
that focus on just one of the challenges – for instance 
capacity markets to remunerate fixed costs – do not 
deal with the other problems and entail the risk of 
introducing further distortions.
Concept
The two-market solution addresses these issues by 
creating separate markets for different sorts of power 
(‘on demand’ and ‘as available’) at both producer and 
consumer ends. For producers, dispatchable plants 
would operate in the ‘on demand’ or flexible market, 
be dispatched according to merit order when needed 
and paid on broadly the same basis as at present. 
Intermittent plants would participate in the ‘as 
available’ market; in principle, they would operate as 
available and, at least initially, be paid a price reflecting 
the levelised cost of electricity from the particular 
source in question (with the price normally set via 
auctions at the investment stage). This is not in itself 
very different from the current Feed-In Tariff (FiT) 
auction arrangements which are used in a number of 
EU countries; however, the idea is that the differing 
costs and operation of ‘as available’ and ‘on demand’ 
sources would also be reflected in the retail market. 
Consumers would be able to select ‘on demand’ or ‘as 
available’ power (for which they would normally have 
separate meter readings) or combinations of the two 
sources. Initially – as at present – it is likely that price 
support (or public financing of some renewable costs) 
would be needed either at producer or consumer level 
to make the ‘as available’ offer attractive to consumers, 
3  See the discussion of “pecuniary externalities” in 
the study Nuclear Energy and Renewables, OECD/NEA Paris 
2012, pp. 34-37.
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but over time, as carbon prices increase and renewable 
costs fall, the support could be removed, creating a 
potential exit strategy.
The design is shown schematically in Chart 1.
Design objectives
The design proposed in this contribution aims to:
• Provide signals for investment in both markets and, 
in the long-run, enable investments in renewables 
and conventional plants to be remunerated solely 
from the market;
• Provide efficient signals for operation in the 
‘on demand’ market and encourage consumers 
to maximise their use of ‘as available’ power 
(consumers would now have an understandable 
and effective choice, along with price incentives, to 
use this power; markets for demand response, on-
site storage, distributed generation and the supply 
chain that supports these and other services, would 
develop in response to their preferences);
• Provide meaningful signals for consumers – in 
effect security would be privatised and consumers 
would be able to decide for themselves how far 
they were prepared to pay for secure supplies 
(system stability is a slightly different matter and 
would still be subject to system operator control). 
It would be possible for consumers effectively 
to use their own Value of Lost Load (VOLL) 
assessments in deciding whether to access the ‘on 
demand’ market;
• Provide scope for incorporating distributed 
resources, and network and transmission costs, 
using the same general principles;
• By these means, provide for overall system 
Figure 1: Schematic of two-market design
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optimisation on the basis of consumer preferences;
• Provide an exit strategy – the support shown 
in the schematic above could be removed over 
time; intermittent generators would be able to 
remunerate their investments from the market 
once it had developed sufficiently to be understood 
and used by consumers;
• Deal with the problem of ‘pecuniary externalities’ 
by keeping the markets separate, at least in 
commercial terms, thereby providing investment 
signals and the prospect of fixed price recovery for 
flexible generation.
Methodology
The proposals presented here are based on a qualitative 
approach, rather than modelling – in the view of the 
authors it is not possible to undertake meaningful 
modelling at this stage, since we do not have adequate 
information about consumer preferences or likely 
technological developments. We are not therefore in a 
position to assess how to optimise the overall welfare 
impacts. 
In essence, the design is a large-scale effort to reveal 
consumer preferences and support the development 
of a supply chain that would respond to those 
preferences. The authors believe there is insufficient 
evidence available from current market structures on 
revealed consumer preferences and that the alternative 
of relying on stated consumer preferences that are 
incorporated into existing markets, e.g. via capacity 
mechanisms and centrally determined VOLLs, is liable 
only to introduce and rigidify distortions. 
Implementation
A two-market approach could in practice take many 
forms. However, we would suggest that four underlying 
principles are essential to the concept as presented 
here.
At wholesale level:
• Economic separation of markets so that 
intermittent low and zero marginal cost plants 
which receive support from non-market sources 
do not create ‘pecuniary externalities’ for flexible 
plants with significant marginal costs;
• Price signals in both markets which are capable of 
remunerating investment and guiding operation.
At retail level:
• Separation of the consumer offer as between ‘as 
available’ and ‘on demand’ options;
• Cost pass-through from the two wholesale 
markets via the two separate offers respectively.
Within these broad guidelines a number of detailed 
design options are available. Some are explored in more 
detail in a fuller paper by the present authors;4 it sets 
out ways in which the two markets could be separated 
in commercial terms, while retaining a unified overall 
electricity supply structure; and how incentives 
could be created for suppliers to balance supply and 
demand in each market, and thereby encourage the 
development of a flexible and self-sustaining consumer 
market for intermittent power.
Transition and the 
longer term
The two-market approach is designed to a large extent 
as a transitional measure in the sense of being a process 
of discovery – it will take time to set up the systems, 
hardware and consumer understanding for a fully self-
sustaining low-carbon power supply. In particular, it 
will take time to delineate the demand side resource 
potential and it will require systems to be in place that 
make it simple and practical for consumers to engage 
with it. Therefore, it is difficult to be definitive about 
the long-run.
Uncertainty also applies to technology on the supply 
side: it is in theory possible that in the long-run 
most plants will be primarily based on fixed costs. 
In the view of the authors, that outcome is unlikely. 
It is almost certainly always going to be cheaper, for 
straightforward economic reasons, to provide flexibility 
via plants that have a relatively high marginal/fixed 
cost ratio, like fossil or biomass combustion plants – 
or have a significant opportunity cost because of the 
4  https://www.oxfordenergy.org/publications/
decarbonised-electricity-system-future-two-market-
approach/.
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storability of their power source, like hydro – rather 
than via plants whose costs are almost entirely fixed. 
However, should the situation arise where all plants 
were essentially based on fixed costs, it would in 
principle still be possible to apply the overall two-
market approach, with prices in the flexibility market 
reflecting scarcity or congestion. Clearly, prices could 
in theory rise to very high levels on this scenario, but 
the aim is by that time to have created a capacity for self-
supply or demand management amongst consumers 
which would at least mitigate the consequences (or, in 
the view of the authors, mean that the scenario itself 
was very unlikely – i.e. short-term demand response 
is likely to be more economic than short-term use of 
generation sources whose costs are entirely fixed).
With these caveats, it would be the authors’ expectation 
that in the long-run, government intervention in the 
electricity market could be reduced to setting the 
overall framework conditions. Policy intervention 
would continue to be needed in order to incorporate 
the carbon externality and ensure that carbon targets 
were met. However, this could be done either by a 
carbon price or (the authors’ preference) through 
tradable carbon intensity targets;5 the use of one of 
these options would get away from the need to support 
particular technologies or sources (like storage or 
demand response) and allow markets to select the 
lowest cost options. In other respects, the market 
should be self-sustaining. Over time, the consumer 
trade-off between security and price should be well-
established, and market prices should be capable of 
signalling the need for investment in different power 
sources, including consumer-side sources such as in-
house storage and consumer demand management.
Conclusions
Electricity markets are broken; they no longer fulfil their 
primary functions of providing appropriate signals 
for producers and consumers. The problem arises 
from a combination of changes in technology (from 
predominantly marginal cost plants to predominantly 
capital cost plants) and of policy (support for 
intermittent renewable plants) which undermine 
5  See Buchan D., and Keay M (2016), Europe’s Long 
Energy Journey: towards an energy union? Annex 2, Oxford 
University Press, pp. 199-209.
traditional market structures. In the view of the authors, 
markets will require fundamental reform to resolve 
the problem. Existing market structures are inevitably 
leading to greater central intervention – support for 
renewables and the creation of capacity markets. 
There needs to be a shift in emphasis which will enable 
consumer preferences to be expressed clearly and drive 
overall market development. The reforms needed will 
require not just a change in market design but also in 
consumer attitudes to electricity – this will necessitate 
a relatively simple and comprehensible basic offer at 
consumer level.
Against this background the authors propose a 
new approach to market design which will enable 
intermittent renewable sources to be accommodated; 
maintain overall system reliability while enabling 
consumers to put a value on their own supply security; 
provide clear signals to generators for investment 
and operation; and provide an ‘exit strategy’ allowing 
government intervention to be limited in the long-run 
to the setting of framework conditions only. In the 
view of the authors, no other proposal put forward to 
date can meet all these objectives.
Fundamental changes are under way in electricity – 
the aim should be to let consumers drive the process 
rather than central decision-makers. The two-market 
design aspires to open the way for them to do so.
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MARKETS 
REIMAGINED 
TO FINANCE 
FLEXIBLE, LOW-
CARBON AND LOW-
COST ELECTRICITY 
SYSTEMS
David Nelson and Brendan Pierpont
Introduction1
CPI-EF carried out an analysis for the Energy 
Transitions Commission (ETC) which found that by 
2030 a grid powered by the sun and wind could be 
cheaper than building a new system based on gas, 
including costs for flexibility and backup (Figure 1).2 
The study also found that most regions have enough 
flexible capacity to reach or exceed 30% variable 
renewable energy in their generation mix without the 
need for further investment. 
Decarbonisation of the grid at low cost is a massive 
prize and one that could be winnable within just a few 
years thanks to dramatic technology cost declines. 
But this future is by no means assured. As we see in 
today’s wholesale market, signals to incentivize new 
investments to get to high shares of variable renewable 
energy are being eroded by low or negative electricity 
pricing. 
Our work with the ETC has brought us to a level of 
new understanding about what needs to be done to 
1 This brief presents concepts that are outlined in more 
detail in Nelson D., B. Pierpont (2017), Markets for Low Carbon, 
Low Cost Electricity Systems, CPI Energy Finance, October 2017.
2 Pierpont B., D. Nelson, A. Goggins, and D. Posner 
(2017), Flexibility: the path to low-carbon, low-cost electricity 
grids, CPI-EF, April, available at https://climatepolicyinitiative.
org/publication/flexibility-path-low-carbon-low-cost-
electricity-grids/. 
create markets that send the right signals to ensure 
efficient operations in a low-carbon system and to 
incentivise the development of more flexible capacity, 
the cornerstone of the future renewable-based grid. 
So far, we have identified three interlinked key 
challenges, mostly around financing and incentives, 
that could block or unlock the pathway to this future: 
Finance (mainly for new generation supply)
• Risk allocation – Market mechanisms should 
allocate risk appropriately, and not create risks for 
investors to manage, unless investors are a low cost 
path for mitigating them.
• Investors – Markets need to attract investors 
whose risk and reward position is aligned with the 
asset fundamentals.
• Financial vehicles – Financing instruments need 
to adjust to match the needs of optimum investors.
Incentives (mainly for system flexibility)
• Capacity to deliver flexibility – Encourage 
market participants to offer more storage, demand 
response, and flexible generation.
• Technology development – To lower the cost and 
improve the performance of emerging technologies 
and processes.
• Dispatch of flexibility resources – Balancing 
flexibility needs, including short-term versus long-
term flexibility, and locational flexibility (e.g., 
distributed versus wholesale).
Transition (for everything)
• The technology learning curve – Brings 
down the cost of new technology through 
replicable deployment, scale and technological 
improvements.
• Market rollout and development of new types 
of energy businesses – Drives innovation and 
competition to provide energy services at the 
lowest cost and highest quality.
• New investors – Lowers the cost of capital for the 
sector by aligning investor and electricity market 
needs.
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Wholesale market that is no 
longer whole
Existing electricity market designs usually allocate 
risks to market participants who are not able to 
manage them efficiently, and in so doing they raise 
the cost of finance and energy significantly. In today’s 
markets, the more renewables we put on the system, 
the less valuable all generation assets become and the 
resulting low or even negative wholesale prices send 
market signals to investors that electricity generation 
is a risky business. 
Today’s electricity markets set prices based on the 
variable costs of the “marginal” power plant. In other 
words, we stack all of the power plants in a system from 
the lowest to the highest variable cost, and the last plant 
that has to turn on to meet demand in a given hour sets 
the clearing price for the whole market (Figure 2).
Retaining this model in a high-renewables scenario 
will create some significant issues. First of all, fuel 
price risk is passed to those who do not burn fuel. 
In addition, wind and solar power plants have little 
control over when they produce power, so they cannot 
necessarily generate electricity in response to changing 
prices. Curtailment policies that place the financial risk 
entirely on renewable energy suppliers can also lead 
to dramatic increases in the cost of capital and cost of 
energy from these plants.3 We are left with a market 
that will produce higher total costs even in spite of low 
wholesale prices. 
Structuring a new 
electricity market
A new market design needs to address several issues at 
once. It should create a stable environment for the low-
cost financing of long-term capital intensive energy 
3  Nelson D., M. Huxham, S. Muench and B. O’Connell 
(2016), Policy and Investment in German renewable energy, 
CPI, April, available at https://climatepolicyinitiative.org/
publication/policy-investment-german-renewables/.
Figure 1: By 2030, an electricity system run on renewables could be cheaper than a gas-based system
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generation. But at the same time, it should concentrate 
the price signals and risks associated with delivering 
power when and where it is needed with those assets 
best suited to respond to and manage those risks.
One approach to meeting these goals would be to split 
the market into two parts (Table 1):
• An energy market: a market for trading electricity 
as a commodity, independent of time and location, 
that relies on auctions for long-term energy 
contracts to enable long-term low-cost financing 
of capital intensive energy resources.
• A delivery market: a market for the delivery of 
energy when and where it is needed to meet demand 
and ensure reliability. This market would concentrate 
incentives for flexibility on the subset of market 
actors that is best suited to manage those risks.
This market design concept is intended as a starting 
point for a discussion about the major challenges 
facing today’s electricity markets that will enable us to 
focus on the right solutions. 
The combination of these markets could lead to lower 
financing costs for long-term capital intensive power 
plants, like wind and solar, as many of the key risks 
facing these assets would be transferred into the delivery 
market. At the same time, sharpened market signals for 
flexibility would provide a strong economic incentive 
to flexible power plants, battery energy storage and 
demand-side flexibility providers (Figure 3).
In addition, a variety of electricity system services – 
ancillary services such as short-term reserves and 
frequency control – would continue to be needed and 
could rely on market mechanisms similar to those we 
have in place today.
The long-term energy market
The long-term energy market could be constructed as 
follows:
• Each year, the system operator or electricity retailers 
would construct a long-term forecast of the energy 
needs to determine how much contracted energy 
the market would need to procure;
• Based on this long-term forecast, a certain portion 
of that energy need would be auctioned, where 
the lowest-cost bidder(s) would receive long-term 
Figure 2: Current market models
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Figure 3: Long-term energy prices are stable while delivery prices vary significantly
Figure 4: Clean Energy Investment Trust unbundles cash flows for different types of investor 
Table 1: Characteristics of the energy and delivery markets
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contracts to supply electricity at a fixed price, with 
delivery starting in one to three years to allow time 
for construction of new plants;
• As old contracts expire and demand estimates 
change each year, the amount of energy procured 
through these long-term energy auctions could be 
adjusted;
• While long-term contracted energy resources 
would be paid the clearing price for their auction 
(or in some cases may be paid as they bid), 
consumers and non-contracted energy suppliers 
(e.g. those that provide energy while participating 
in the delivery market) would receive a blended 
price, reflecting the weighted average price across 
all contracted energy in a given year.
This market design could enable financial innovation 
to further reduce costs. In many ways, renewable 
energy investments look a lot like a bond, with a large 
fixed investment up front followed by many years of 
steady cash flows thereafter. At CPI-EF we have been 
working with institutional investors to design a new 
investment vehicle that could lower the cost of energy 
from wind by 15-17 per cent. This Clean Energy 
Investment Trust (CEIT) structures cash flows from 
a portfolio of renewable energy projects to create a 
bond-like product which will appeal to pension funds 
and insurance companies looking to match their long-
term liabilities with investment grade returns.4 
The energy market would provide a predictable, low 
risk stream of cash flows to projects under long-term 
contract. This would enable financial instruments like 
the CEIT, which are designed for bond-like liability 
hedging and debt investors. Thus, the energy market 
does not include curtailment risk, etc., except for at the 
initial bidding, when these projects can make decisions 
that mitigate this risk. 
Drawing on experience with long-
term energy auctions in Brazil
Auction mechanisms have been used for decades to 
4  Varadarajan U., et al. (2017), Mobilising low-cost 
institutional investment in renewable energy, CPI-EF, August, 
available at https://climatepolicyinitiative.org/publication/
clean-energy-investment-trust-financial-innovation-
renewables/ .
Figure 5: The auction based Brazilian electricity market
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procure electricity. Auctions are common in renewable 
energy procurement as a tool for price discovery for 
long-term renewable energy contracts (for example, 
California’s Renewable Auction Mechanism). In 
addition, most renewable energy tenders and requests 
for offers for bilateral contracts strongly resemble 
auctions.
However, Brazil’s electricity market structure puts 
auctions for long-term energy contracts right at 
the centre.5 Each year, a certain amount of new and 
existing generation is procured through long-term 
contracts (typically 15-30 years with a three to five year 
lead time), while existing plants that are not currently 
contracted typically bid to supply shorter-term 
contracts with immediate to short lead times.
Brazil’s long-term energy auction system has led to 
low costs and facilitated investment in new hydro 
generation. However, the system is not without its 
challenges, particularly exclusion of technologies 
other than hydro from auctions, potential gaming of 
5  As described by Maurer L., and L. Barroso (2011), 
Electricity Auctions: An Overview of Efficient Practices, The World 
Bank; and by Moreno R., et al. (2010), Auction approaches of 
long term contracts to ensure generation investment in electricity 
markets: Lessons from the Brazilian and Chilean experiences, 
Energy Policy, 38 (10), pp. 5758-5769.
hydroelectric production estimates, and crowding out 
of private generation investments by low cost publicly 
funded projects.
The delivery market
Once kWh have been contracted in the long-term 
energy market, there will be greater certainty and less 
risk for contracted energy resources. Nevertheless, the 
electricity system still needs to ensure that electricity is 
delivered at the time and location where it is needed, 
instantaneously. 
The delivery market would be designed to meet the 
difference between expected generation from the long-
term energy market and real-time electricity demand 
at each location in the grid, by providing robust market 
signals for flexibility. This market would provide short-
term price signals, based on day-ahead or near real-
time markets. It would also provide locational price 
signals, differentiating the value of delivery services 
between locations on the grid. It would have several 
layers (Figure 6):
• First, flexibility resources – those that can generate, 
hold back generation, consume, or store and shift 
electricity – would be able to bid directly into 
Figure 6: Delivery market pays to deliver energy purchased to a specific time and place
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a delivery market. Ideally, this delivery market 
would be open to a wide range of technologies, 
and would aim to minimize the cost of matching 
supply with demand at a particular place and point 
in time;
• Second, those same flexibility resources could 
be owned and/or operated by businesses that 
manage a portfolio of assets, much in the way an 
independent power producer or power trader 
might today. By managing a diversified portfolio 
of flexibility resources these businesses would 
have the incentive to manage flexibility risks and 
compete to keep costs low;
• Finally, consumers could play several roles in 
the delivery market. They could contract with an 
aggregator who manages delivery costs on their 
behalf (like today’s retailers), or purchase delivery 
services directly from the market and potentially 
use automated demand side flexibility technologies 
to manage their own exposure to delivery market 
risks. 
Concentrating flexibility risks 
in a flexible market
In today’s power markets, most participants are either 
directly or indirectly exposed to volatile electricity 
prices. For flexible generators that can respond quickly 
to changing grid conditions, these prices are effective 
signals for driving flexible operations. But for some 
resources – namely capital intensive renewables – 
these volatile prices introduce risk that the resources 
have little ability to manage. 
By partitioning the market into an energy and a 
delivery market, the volatile price signals for flexibility 
would be concentrated in the delivery market, where 
more flexible resources would have stronger signals to 
respond. 
In addition, this new market model would separate 
the value of the commodity (kWh) from the value 
of the delivery and flexibility services. In doing so, it 
would allow consumers (and aggregators acting on 
consumers’ behalf) to see a clear market signal for the 
value of firm delivery of electricity to a particular point 
in space and time.
Much like the PJM market or other locational marginal 
price based systems, the delivery market could use the 
concept of locational marginal pricing for delivery 
services. The key difference would be that rather than 
bidding to supply energy to meet demand at a given 
point in time and space, the delivery market would 
clear the difference between demand and production 
from contracted generators in the energy market, 
which in some cases could be negative. This, of course, 
would send strong signals for energy storage, demand 
shifting and the efficient use of transmission.
Conclusions
Overall, this two-market model builds on the success 
of current electricity market models, while fixing the 
areas where these models are distorting investment 
decisions and risk allocation for a low-carbon electricity 
industry. It also redefines the concept of a market price 
for energy to reflect the reality of low carbon energy as 
the source of significant new capacity.
We believe that the key benefits are possible both in 
the energy market and in the delivery market. By 
unbundling the delivery and the commodity, the 
energy market will be able to reduce the risks for 
power producers, lowering their cost of capital. In such 
a market, long-term contracts and load differentiation 
charges will provide appropriate incentives to 
generators. The cost of low-carbon electricity will fall 
as the delivery risk is concentrated on those who can 
absorb and optimize that risk. The delivery market 
will expand the range of actors participating in the 
supply of flexibility and other ancillary services, but 
only flexible generation, consumers and storage are 
likely to benefit. The base price for delivery markets 
could be near zero, with prices swinging from positive 
to negative depending on congestion which provides 
a clear signal of the value of flexibility to market 
participants. Traders could also harness curtailment of 
non-dispatchable generation by bidding curtailment of 
contracted energy supply into the delivery market as a 
potential additional (but riskier) source of value on top 
of a long-term contract for energy.
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